











UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Understanding the livelihoods of small-
scale fishers in Lamberts Bay: 





Master of Philosophy in Environment, Society, and Sustainability, 
UCT/EGS 
EGS5008H 
Supervisor: Dr. Serge Raemaekers 
May 2015 
 













The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 

















Small-scale fishers (SSFs) are among the most vulnerable socio-economic groups because of 
their high dependence on marine resource harvesting. While small-scale fisheries employ the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s fishers and contribute substantially to the global catch, 
they are, on the whole, marginalised and ignored. Despite their importance in providing food 
security and livelihoods in coastal communities, state management authorities routinely 
neglect small-scale fisheries in favour of industrial fisheries. In South Africa, the exclusion of 
small-scale fishers is intricately linked with the oppressive policies of the apartheid 
government, which limited access to the fisheries for the largely Black and Coloured small-
scale fishers. Changes within fisheries management practices led to the development of 
management tools that moved away from conventional resource-centred strategies, to 
management approaches that recognised the complexity of natural and ecological processes 
inherent within small-scale fisheries.  
Many of these new approaches have been embraced in South Africa’s new small-scale 
fisheries policy. The policy represents a long line of arguably failed attempts at reforming 
South African fisheries undertaken by the South African government. While the policy is 
unique in the scale of participation by the small-scale fishers themselves it is still faced with 
the hurdle of implementation. The adoption of the individual rights approach embodied by 
the individual quota (IQ) system in the post-apartheid reforms has led to divisions within the 
community. Fishing rights benefited a small elite and disenfranchised many more fishers for 
whom fishing was a livelihood, but were excluded from the rights allocations.  The new 
small-scale fisheries policy is widely acknowledged as progressive and carries the hope of 
inclusion for small-scale fishers along South Africa’s coasts. After decades of 
disenfranchisement and individual rights allocations, the major challenge in the new policy’s 
implementation will be dealing with the range of complex and unique communities in which 
the policy will be carried out.  
The purpose of this study was to establish a profile of the Lamberts Bay small-scale fisher 
groups and their perceptions regarding the new small-scale fisher policy, in order to inform 
the policy’s implementation in Lamberts Bay. The study employed a multi-method research 
strategy predominantly consisting of household surveys, key informant interviews, and focus 
groups. These were used to understand the socio-economic context of the small-scale fishers, 
to determine whether socio-economic differences existed between the fisher groups, to gather 
the perceptions of the fisher groups with respect to the new policy, and to aid in identifying 
the factors that will enable the expectations and needs of different groups to be 
accommodated in the SSF policy implementation.  
The study focused on two fisher groups: West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holders 
(WCRLRHs) and Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers. It was found the WCRLRHs earned far 
greater income than the IRP fishers, as a result of the WCRLRHs superior Lobster quota 
allocation. Both fisher groups showed almost identical historical livelihood dependence on 
fisheries prior to the introduction of the IQs. This allocation of the IQs did not represent a 
repetition of historical instances of elite capture in Lamberts Bay, but, however, the 
introduction of the medium-term IQs in 2001 and the long-term IQs in 2005 resulted in 
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externally imposed income differences within the fishing community. This led to household 
food security and income differences among the fishers, which created divisions within the 
Lamberts Bay fishing community. All the IRP fishers had missed meals as a result of their 
household food security context, while very few WCRLRHs experienced comparable food 
insecurity. The far-reaching reforms of the new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP) were 
therefore overwhelmingly welcomed by the IRP fishers while the WCRLRHs perceived the 
policy as a threat to their existing privilege.  
The key finding of this research was that the Lamberts Bay fishing community is not 
homogenous and struggles with a low sense of community cohesion. This was a direct result 
of the external income differences imposed by DAFF’s fishing rights and permit allocations. 
Implementation strategies for the SSF policy must take this community fracturing into 
account. Particular attention must be paid to addressing the general educational, institutional 
and infrastructural deficits that plague both fisher groups, in addition to an in-depth 
understanding of the challenges of incorporating two fisher groups with important household 
differences in relative prosperity, into one small-scale fisher policy. Future fisheries research 
in the Lamberts Bay community must focus on specific implementation challenges centred on 
fisher co-operatives, giving agency to the fishers by liberating the fishers from the 
exploitative established fisher companies, and incorporating the small-scale fishers into the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Fishing is one of the world’s oldest occupations, and developed in the period when human 
societies depended heavily on hunting and gathering (Bavinck, et al., 2014). It is estimated 
that over 120 million people are involved in activities that relate directly to the capture, 
processing, sale, and marketing of fish with the overwhelming majority (over 95 per cent) 
located in developing countries (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Poverty in fishing communities is 
due to a variety of socio-institutional factors beyond income, such as land tenure security, 
access to health and education, and exclusion from political decision-making; factors which 
are also recognised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Bene & Friend, 2011; 
Charles, 2011). This makes small-scale fishers (SSFs) among the most vulnerable socio-
economic groups because they, in particular, are exposed to natural and economic related 
crises (Bene, 2009). 
Despite their importance in providing food security and livelihoods in coastal communities, 
small-scale fisheries are on the whole ignored and marginalised throughout the world (Hauck, 
2009; Zeller, et al., 2007). State management authorities systematically neglect the small-
scale fishing sector in favour of industrial fisheries. This has resulted in a demographic 
information deficit of coastal communities (Sowman, et al., 2014). Further, small-scale 
fisheries suffer from a negative public image because of the myths and misconceptions 
fuelled by deficient data, insight, and knowledge (Kolding, et al., 2014). This is true even 
while small-scale fisheries are considerably more efficient, less wasteful, and provide more 
livelihood support per tonne produced than industrial fisheries (Sadovy, 2005; Chuenpagdee, 
et al., 2006). In South Africa, not only do small scale fisheries suffer from persistent neglect, 
as described above, but this neglect takes on particular social equity and justice issues centred 
on race and South Africa’s apartheid history, the legacy of which continues to plague the 
fisheries.  
Subsequent to the democratic elections in 1994 and the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, 
South Africa undertook reforms aimed at addressing racial injustice and equity in the 
fisheries sector. This included publication of a new fisheries policy under the auspices of the 
Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998, which replaced the existing fisheries 
legislation (Van Sittert, et al., 2006; Witbooi, 2006; Isaacs, et al., 2007). Along with other 
policy developments, the MLRA explicitly encouraged ‘transformation’; however, no 
consensus existed on how to measure it. At least for fishers, ‘transformation’ implied 
achieving formal direct access to marine resources (Isaacs, 2006). To achieve this reform, the 
post-apartheid South African government relied on individual transferable quota-based (ITQ-
based) fisheries. 
 The ITQ approach was intended to broaden access to fisheries, in particular, for the 
marginalised sectors consisting of the artisanal and small-scale fishers (Isaacs, 2013).  While 
progress had been made in granting access to poor fishers, the complexity of the fisheries 
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sector meant progress was haphazard. A fundamental component of the complexity was the 
individual rights-based approach to fisheries allocations. This required the identification of 
bona-fide fishers and the appropriate marine resources that matched their livelihood profiles 
(Sowman, 2006). The consequence was that the small-scale fishing sector was not formally 
recognised and catered for by the subsequent MLRA-sanctioned medium- and long-term 
rights allocations (Sowman, et al., 2014).  
Western Cape fishers (supported by NGOs) took the Minister to court to contest their 
exclusion from the rights allocations in the fisheries sector and the resultant social and 
economic impacts of the ITQ approach (George K and others vs. the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2004) (Isaacs, 2013). The fishers contested that the 
government’s failure to allocate harvest rights to the small-scale fisher group violated their 
Constitutional rights and inflicted substantial economic hardship upon the fishers (Sowman, 
et al., 2014). Beyond the matters of the court case, the ITQ approach also led to high levels of 
poaching of species such as West Coast Rock Lobster, hereafter referred to as Lobster (Jasus 
lalandii) and Abalone (Haliotis midae) (due to high demand and prices), poverty in fishing 
communities worsened, and the communities were radically divided into factions 
representative of rights-holders and fishers without rights, as well as poacher versus non-
poacher (Stewart, et al., 2010). By court order, a new policy that specifically catered for the 
small-scale fishers was therefore finally gazetted in June 2012 (Sunde, et al., 2013).  
Among other sweeping reforms, this new policy espoused a paradigmatic shift from the 
individual rights-based approach to a co-management and community rights-based approach 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). This meant fishing rights would 
no longer be issued to individual fishers but to community entities. For the implementation of 
the policy to occur efficiently, fishing communities are ideally conceptualised as homogenous 
entities. However, the distribution of the Commercial Rights and the Interim Relief permits 
over the last decade has been seen to have a fracturing effect in South African fishing 
communities (Stewart, et al., 2010). Van Sittert (2003) goes further stating that a 
homogenous community along the West Coast has never existed in the first place. 
Implementation of the small-scale policy therefore requires a context-sensitive approach and 
flexibility in addressing the nuances of every fishing community. Lamberts Bay as a 
traditional fishing community along the West Coast of South Africa presents unique 
challenges to the implementation of the new policy, and is the focus of this thesis.  
Fishing is deeply ingrained in the history of Lamberts Bay (Figure 2) and apart from primary 
agriculture, fishing is considered the first industrial development of the Sandveld region 
(Enderstein, 2009). Marine resource harvesting was historically conducted by Coloured1 and 
European fishermen for the local market; the resources harvested included: Cape Bream 
                                                          
1Contrary to international usage, in South Africa the term ‘‘Coloured’’ does not refer to black people in general. 
It instead alludes to a diverse group of people descended largely from slaves, indigenous Khoisan peoples and 
other black people who had been assimilated to colonial society by the late 19th century. Being also partly 
descended from European settlers, Coloureds are popularly regarded as being of ‘‘mixed race’’ and occupy an 
indeterminate status in the South African racial hierarchy, distinct from the historically dominant white minority 
and the numerically predominant African population. ‘‘Black’’ is a generic term in South Africa for those ethnic 
groups identified by apartheid policy as ‘‘Indian’’, ‘‘African’’ or ‘‘Coloured’’ (Isaacs, 2006).  
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(Pachymetopon blochii) (known colloquially as Hottentot), Snoek (Thyrsites atun), and 
Maasbanker or Horse Mackerel (Trachurus capensis) (Enderstein, 2009).  Like all other 
South African fishing communities, Lamberts Bay was subject to management by ITQs, and 
the resultant community fragmentation carries implications for the implementation of the new 
policy. The particular nature of this fragmentation will be explored by this thesis with the 
view to inform the implementation of the new Small-Scale Fisheries policy in Lamberts Bay. 
 
1.2 Aim  
To understand the livelihoods of various fisher groups of Lamberts Bay and the implications 
for the implementation of the SSF policy. 
1.3 Objectives 
1. Understand the socio-economic context of the small-scale fisher groups in Lamberts 
Bay 
2. Assess socio-economic differences between these groups 
3. Gather the perceptions of these different groups with respect to the new policy 
4. Identify factors that will enable the expectations and needs of these different groups to 
be accommodated in SSF policy roll-out and model. 
 








Figure 3: Onlookers and buyers observing the day's catch (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 International Small-scale fisheries 
Worldwide, small-scale fisheries are estimated to employ 37 million people, 90% of whom 
are located in Asia. In addition, secondary endeavours associated with fishing are the 
occupation of another estimated 100 million people (FAO, 2008-2014). Small-scale fisheries 
are also responsible for roughly half of the globe’s entire catch and underpin the local 
economies of many coastal areas by providing employment, fish for household consumption, 
and financial benefits from selling fish (ICSF, 2014; Walmsley, et al., 2006). However, 
fisheries governance policies are too often designed with the view that small-scale fisheries 
are homogenous entities, neglecting their complex, globalised, and constantly changing 
nature (Johnson, 2006).  
The characteristics of small-scale fisheries worldwide are incredibly diverse, spanning the 
spectrum of social, ecological, and economic aspects of fishing communities (Ratner & 
Allison, 2012). For these reasons, small-scale fisheries are terribly difficult to define, amidst 
suggestions they are indeed impossible to define. Two features of SSFs give rise to this 
conception: first what is considered small in one area can be considered large-scale in 
another; and second, SSFs show tremendous diversity depending on their context 
(Chuenpagdee, et al., 2006). Despite the multiplicity of small-scale fisheries, 
characterizations of SSFs display a significant amount of homogeneity and consist of any one 
or a combination of these features: fishing as a defining feature of a community, tribe or 
caste; the use of specific types of gear and their place along the fishing hierarchy in a national 
context; and, finally, whether fishing is part of a long-standing tradition (Mathew, 2003). 
Therefore, the term small-scale fishers has broadly come to mean:  
“…fishers who use beach-landing craft and passive fishing gear and have a limited 
range of operation. Generally their occupation is less capital-intensive, and catches 
are less voluminous per unit of effort (Bavinck, 2005, p. 806).” 
Fishermen and women remain some of the poorest and most marginalised groups within the 
globe’s societies, and disproportionately so, the women of rural fishing communities 
(Williams, 2002). Fisheries is riddled with a strong gender bias against women (McCay & 
Jentoft, 1996). This is because, historically, fishing has been framed as an exclusively male 
domain (Siason, 1998). Women do not even self-identify as fishers in contexts where fishing 
is culturally considered as the men’s job (Kleiber, et al., 2014).  
Women are frequently limited to post-harvest activities such as smoking, drying, salting, and 
marketing, which generally earns less than harvesting (Bene, 2008; Vunisea, 1996; Williams, 
2001; Suwanrangsi, 1998). Some fisherwomen occupy very low status in the social hierarchy; 
a position reinforced by cultural beliefs, norms, laws, and discriminate regulatory practices 
that among other things, consider women out at sea as bad luck (Bene, 2003; Weeratunge, et 
al., 2010; Choo, et al., 2008).   
Women’s marginalisation is compounded when access to the fishery is increasingly restricted 
through, for instance, Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) allocations. Men who are 
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excluded from the allocation process subsequently engage in fish trading and processing, 
leaving the women vulnerable in an increasingly competitive arena (Gehab, et al., 2008; 
Gordon, 2005). This highlights the fact that men are able to work in every field of the fishery 
sector, while very few women will choose to work on board boats (Goncuoglu & Unal, 
2011).   
Social ills such as alcoholism is prevalent in many fishing communities, primarily due to the 
poverty and marginalisation experienced by fisherfolk (Allison & Seeley, 2004). Alcoholism 
disproportionately affects the men in the community, while the increased household burden 
remains with the women. Women’s participation is crucial to the survival of fishing 
communities and the preservation of their way of life (Medard, et al., 2002). The role of 
gender in the development process therefore needs to be a key part of any policy 
interventions aimed at creating sustainable livelihoods (Burnett, 2005). 
The resource environment in which small-scale fishers operate presents unique challenges in 
itself. SSFs disproportionately depend on natural resources as opposed to other economic 
activities where the option of alternative revenue streams are easily accessible. In addition, 
the often apparent open-access arrangement of the natural resources that small-scale fisher 
folk harvest arguably leads to resource degradation, increasing poverty, and associated social 
marginalisation (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Small-scale fishers therefore live precariously 
because of their vulnerability and susceptibility to misfortune (Kolding, et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the asymmetrical focus on industrial fisheries research has neglected the roles 
and functioning of small-scale fisheries, which also suffer from an information deficit 
(Kolding & Van Zwieten, 2011). Small-scale fisheries’ problems were therefore erroneously 
conceptualised and addressed indiscriminately from industrial fisheries; the basis for this was 
Hardin’s (1968) treatise on the ‘Tragic Commons’.  
2.2 Concepts in Small-Scale Fisheries Management 
Garrit Hardin’s ‘Tragic Commons’ is generally cited as the leading paradigm in the 
management of common-pool resources, such as fisheries. He described the degradation that 
occurred when many users exploited a common resource, where the individual benefited 
from exploiting the resource, and the burdens or costs were shared among the group (Hardin, 
1968; Olstrom, 1990; Raemaekers, 2009). Describing the exploitation of a common 
pasturage, Olstrom (1990: 2), quoting Hardin (1968: 1244), writes:  
“Each herder is motivated to add more and more animals because he receives the 
direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from 
overgrazing.”  
The consequence when fisheries are the common resource is that every fisher engages in a 
‘race to fish’ because of the absence of incentives to conserve the resource (Hilborn, et al., 
2003). Inspired by Hardin’s arguments, several countries extended their political sovereignty 
from three to two hundred nautical miles from shore in response to the intensifying 
exploitation of coastal fisheries (Juda, 1991; Nadelson, 1992). It was only in 1982 that the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sanctioned customary marine 
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law and thereby recognised the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in which states could 
exercise complete economic and political sovereignty. Coastal waters therefore became the 
property of states, replacing their previous conceptualisation as open-access entities 
(Mansfield, 2004). The consequence of this evolution saw biological scientists coming to the 
fore of fisheries management in a highly centralised governance environment. Mathematical 
modelling of single-species fish population dynamics determined the Maximum Sustainable 
Yield (MSY) of specific resources, which was the sole approach to species targets endorsed 
by UNCLOS (Caddy, 1999; Hilborn, 2007). This biological-science dominated approach 
culminated in the annual calculation of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), determined from 
regular stock assessments, catch and effort statistics and resource modelling.  
Out of these developments arose what has been termed the ‘conventional’ or ‘traditional’ 
approach to fisheries management. This recognised that territorial waters remained open to 
all nationals; however, fisher behaviour was regulated through stringent input regulations 
consisting of seasonal closures, effort restrictions, and output controls among which included 
Total Allowable Effort (TAE), quotas, and TACs (Morison, 2004; Hilborn, 2007). Fisheries 
management has subsequently been deemed technocratic because this suite of regulations 
was heavily dependent on scientific information (Raemaekers, 2009). In parallel 
developments on the economic front during the 1950s and ‘60s, economists concerned with 
dwindling fish stocks proposed private property regimes in order to curb the decline in ocean 
fish stocks in lieu of the failed technical controls. The 200 mile EEZ demarcation was 
therefore supported by economists as an important step in limiting access (Caddy & 
Cochrane, 2001; Mansfield, 2004). 
Currently, across varying spatial scales, many combinations of use rights exist, which 
underpin the quota-based fisheries management regime in developing and developed 
countries’ commercial fisheries (Raemaekers, 2009). Fisheries managers therefore have a 
wide variety of tools available, the most important of which, follow: 
i. The development of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) was borne from the 
desire by fisheries managers to limit access to fisheries within the EEZ, and turn the 
resources into private property. ITQs are prevalent in places such as New Zealand, 
Iceland, and Australia (Clark, 1993; Arbuckle, 2000; Mathiasson, 2003; Grafton, et 
al., 2006; Bess & Rallapudi, 2007). An ITQ system distributes the quota shares of the 
TAC, which are then subject to purchase, selling, or lease arrangements among the 
fishers. Fishers who cannot operate successfully eventually sell their quota and exit 
the fishery, which reduces excess capacity and increases the efficiency of the fishery 
(Degnbol, et al., 2006).  
ii. In the context of worldwide collapse of fish stocks, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing has been identified as a leading contributor (Pitcher, et al., 
2002; Ainsworth & Pitcher, 2005; Berkes, et al., 2006; Gallic & Cox, 2006; Sumaila, 
et al., 2006; Vince, 2007). Besides rights allocations and punitive sanctions against 
offenders, other typical measures to combat IUU include Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance (MCS) networks consisting of patrol boats, vessel monitoring systems, 
and fisheries control officers. Due to the inherent mobility of ocean travel, regional 
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cooperation has become an important aspect of reducing IUUs (Erceg, 2006). As an 
example, in 2001, many countries became signatories of the International Plan of 
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (FAO, 2001).  
iii. Biologists and conservationists have solidified Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as 
effective management tools (Clark, 1996). MPAs encourage the restoration of natural 
processes, as well as biological and fishery resource sustainability (Attwood, et al., 
1997). MPAs are well entrenched in the fisheries management arena; many varieties 
have evolved focusing on highly protected demarcations to more flexible multi-use 
areas (Raemaekers, 2009).  
The majority of the world’s fisheries are, however, still prone to the effects of over-
investment while resources are still in decline (FAO, 2004; FAO, 2007). As a result, 
substantial criticism has been levelled at the suite of conventional and rights-based 
management tools. To begin with, resource modelling and estimating the MSY necessitated 
making too many assumptions amidst the elusive accuracy of much of the required data 
(Caddy, 1999). Traditional input and output controls such as TAEs, gear restrictions, and 
TACs have become increasingly rigid in response to declining fisheries, increasing the race 
for fish and other perverse incentives for the fishers (Turner, et al., 1999; Fujita & Bonzon, 
2005). These tools largely failed in achieving resource sustainability within country EEZs 
(Gordon, 1954; Gordon, 1954). Furthermore, while ideally the resource users cover the costs 
of administration, governments tended to rely on taxpayer revenue to manage fisheries; the 
revenues from potential resource rent were therefore never realized (Virdin & Schorr, 2001).  
ITQs have also been the subject of much criticism, primarily from social scientists and 
fishing communities (Raemaekers, 2009). This is because the ITQ system results in the 
concentration of fishing rights to the exclusion of other legitimate fishers, and hence denies 
some fishers their livelihood and the resultant economic contribution to a community’s 
development (McCay, 1995). In addition, by privatising a common property good, the social 
justice of the ITQ system has come under scrutiny (Anderson, 1995; Hannesson, 2005). 
Proponents of the ITQ have countered these arguments by charging users for access to fish 
resources. The rents collected subsequently cover the costs of administration and control 
(Hilborn, et al., 2005), effectively rendering ITQs use rights and not property rights (Grafton, 
1995; Bromley, 2005). MPAs have not lived up to their management objectives (Alder, 
1996), and hence have come under scrutiny from the stakeholders in their implementation. 
The closure of certain areas served to concentrate resource exploitation in other areas 
(Degnbol, et al., 2006), migratory species could not be adequately accommodated by the rigid 
spatial demarcations (Boersma & Parrish, 1999), and most importantly, the exclusion of 
fishing communities with a history of fishing in MPA areas raised the ire of social scientists 
(Jameson, et al., 2002; Jentoft, 2007; Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). It therefore became apparent 
that more inclusive approaches to fisheries were necessary.  
The oceans were conceptualised as existing under an open access regime; the perspective of 
Hardin (1968) and Gordon (1954) therefore suggested resources were effectively managed 
only when privatised or controlled by a central government.  However, this conceptualisation 
also led to the increasing focus on common property-based natural resource management 
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(Agrawal, 2001). This literature was a significant departure from the conventional 
interventionist ideas of fisheries management recognising common property resources under 
ownership of a people group (under a communal property regime) and successfully managed 
for sustainability without the necessity of private property rights (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; 
Hara, 2003). There is no shortage of examples of locally situated small user groups and 
communities managing local natural resources, and this has also inspired funding for 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects (Ruddle, 1998; Van 
Mulekom, 1999; Martin, 2001). Drawing from Balland & Platteau (1996), Raemaekers 
(2009) suggests there is no association between successful fisheries regulation and property 
rights regimes because communal, private, and state property have all experienced failures 
and successes. 
The focus on fishing communities has also served to highlight the small-scale fisheries sector. 
The range of fisheries management tools described above was primarily focused on managing 
the more lucrative large-scale industrial fisheries sector, with the small-scale fisheries sector 
left unattended to by the state (Raemaekers, 2009). Despite their neglect, small-scale fisheries 
are increasingly recognised as critical contributors to incomes and livelihoods of hundreds of 
millions of people globally; the total output from small-scale fisheries nearly matching that of 
the industrial fisheries (Bene, et al., 2007). This disjuncture created a particular management 
problem for fisheries authorities worldwide and so too in South Africa’s small-scale fishing 
communities. It became clear to fisheries management practitioners that new tools and 
approaches needed to be developed (Raemaekers, 2009).  
2.3 The Era of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
CBNRM garnered widespread favour as a fisheries management paradigm (Hara, 2003) and 
was incorporated into the rights-based management approach to fisheries as a fisheries 
management tool (Degnbol, et al., 2006). Concurrently, the discussions around CBNRM led 
to the endorsing of community-based exclusive fishing rights, also called Territorial Use 
Rights Fisheries (TURFs). Chilean ‘Areas for the Management and Exploitation of Benthic 
Resources’ (Áreas de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos-AMERB) are a 
prominent example of TURFs in which local small-scale fishers exercise exclusive rights 
over access (Gonzalez, et al., 2006). The rise of CBNRM and TURFs appeased social 
scientists by reclaiming social concerns and adjusting for issues of inequality amidst the 
desire for economic efficiency. As a result, CBNRM and TURFs constituted a new set of 
management tools that accommodated the various social, economic, and institutional context 
of fishing communities (Raemaekers, 2009).  
However, CBNRM has its limits, and in an attempt to merge the important aspects of state 
control, private and communal property approaches, new management options were 
investigated. The relationship between the state, local fishers, and communities required 
overhaul, and this ushered in the ‘co-management concept’ defined as the distribution of 
management responsibility across the state, organisations, and communities (Jentoft, 1989). 
Co-management effectively grants users a formal role in resource management and serves to 
improve the legitimacy of the management plan (Jentoft, 1989). In conjunction with an 
existing individual or community property rights regime, users are incentivised to protect and 
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monitor the state of their resources (Berkes, et al., 2006). Despite the potential of decreasing 
administration costs, the initial phases of implementation usually require significant capacity 
development both within the government and amongst the community (Nielsen, et al., 2004). 
Even so, co-management has been accommodated as a critical component of the fisheries 
management toolbox and applied to various contexts where ITQs, TURFs, and Community 
Quotas are the prevailing rights regimes (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; Nielsen & Vedsmand, 
1999; Nielsen, et al., 2004; Jentoft, 2005).  
In summary, resource economists have endorsed rights-based management approaches by the 
state as a solution to fisheries problems through privatising common resources using ITQs 
and other rights-based measures. These use rights offer secure and consistent access to 
marine resources and prevent overexploitation of fisheries (Huppert, 2005; Hilborn, 2007; 
World Bank, 2008; Costello, et al., 2008). ITQs also provide incentives for users to conserve 
their resources because of their value as assets, which are linked to the sustainability of the 
resource (Hilborn, et al., 2005). However, privatising fishing rights has faced severe criticism 
from fishing communities, social justice groups and social scientists (Raemaekers, 2009). 
Much of this criticism is due to the negative social effects of ITQs on fishing communities, 
such as in South Africa.  Consequently, use rights such as Community Quotas and TURFs, as 
well as unconventional approaches that include CBNRM and co-management, returned to the 
mainstream and have since become integral to contemporary fisheries management regimes 
(Raemaekers, 2009). In order to understand the consequences of South Africa’s rights-based 
fisheries management approach in fishing communities, this thesis adopted the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach (SLA).  
 
2.4 The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) 
Conceptual underpinning 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) has been adapted in many different forms, the 
most popular, however, being that developed by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) (Isaacs, 2006). The notion of a sustainable livelihood has its roots in 
the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio, where one of the outcomes of the conference was the 
idea that everyone should be granted the opportunity to enjoy a sustainable livelihood (Morse 
& McNamara, 2013). The livelihoods approach is particularly strong because it enriches the 
understanding of poverty, allotting to it multiple dimensions. The livelihoods approach also 
encourages specific outcomes for households, with resilience to external shocks being a key 
component (Isaacs, 2006). A precise definition of a sustainable livelihood is difficult to 
establish; however, Schoones (1998) offers us a comprehensive conception:  
“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base (Schoones, 
1998, p. 5).     
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An important aspect of this approach is the conception of vulnerability that alludes to the 
degree of exposure to risks, shocks, and susceptibility to food insecurity (Brocklesby & 
Fisher, 2003). The primary focus of the SLA is the different patterns of capabilities and asset 
holding that affects the ability of families to withstand shocks (Allison & Horemans, 2006). It 
is important to note ecological principles are not all abandoned; a key component as 
evidenced by the SLA is the sustainability of ecosystems. Extended further, this sustainability 
specifically refers to the ability of the marine resource to maintain productivity in the event of 
major shocks and disturbances (Allison & Ellis, 2001).  
The framework of analysis  
The framework itself is a combination of assets and activities that expresses interrelatedness, 
as shown in Figure 4. Typically, this framework is applied to the household, where a 
household is defined as a social group occupying the same space, which enjoy meals in 
common and coordinate decision-making and the distribution of pooled income (Allison & 
Horemans, 2006). The framework is geared to extract a comprehensive and practically 
focused understanding of fishers’ realities, which can then subsequently inform development 
initiatives and policy documentation (Baumann, 2002). A description of the framework 
follows.  
Vulnerability context and asset types  
The vulnerability context is composed of the trends, shocks, and seasonality that affect 
people’s livelihoods and the availability of assets over which people characteristically have 
limited control (Baumann, 2002). The framework identifies five integrated and interrelated 
asset types. The five assets encompass the financial, physical, social, human, and natural. An 
individual actor, in our case a fisher, may own or acquire access to a particular set of assets. 
The combination of assets is determined by the context in which the fisher lives (Parkinson & 
Ramirez, 2006). Households use the assets in their productive activities in order to draw an 
income and meet their consumption needs, while also seeking to invest in future productive 
activities (Nizamedinkhodjayeva, 2007). A livelihood asset profile is thus drawn from 




The SLA has, however, been identified as having significant weaknesses. These include the 
inability to analyse power and power relations, the inability to deconstruct processes 
influenced by human agency, and, crucially, it is restricted in understanding the highly 
variable ways in which interactions occur between institutional practices and livelihoods 
(Allison & Horemans, 2006). As far as the SLA provides a more complete picture of 
complexities in poor communities, it remains effective, extending beyond other insular 
indices that largely rely on income, employment, or consumption (Brocklesby & Fisher, 
2003; Isaacs, 2006).  




Figure 5: Post-harvest 'flekking' of Snoek (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
This research used case studies as a lens to provide a description of the socio-economic 
characteristics, resource utilisation and harvesting techniques used by the Lamberts Bay 
small-scale fishers. The four principle data gathering methods included:  
a. Household questionnaires 
b. Focus group discussions 
c. Interviews with key informants 
d. Informal Interviews 
Collecting different kinds of data concerning the same phenomenon allowed the researcher to 
obtain greater accuracy in his judgements (Jick, 1979). The benefits of using multiple 
methods of analysing data, a process termed ‘triangulation’, increased confidence in the 
research data, granting the researcher different ways to understand the problem, and allowing 
for a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Thurmond, 2004).  
3.1 Scoping Visit 
A critical step in social science research is the process of informing as far as possible all 
stakeholders about the aims, outcomes and commencement of the project. During an initial 
scoping visit, which was also aimed at piloting a draft householder survey (see below), time 
was spent raising awareness about the research. Lamberts Bay was unfamiliar to the 
researcher and he was therefore required to learn the geographical proximities, establish a 
connection with the family he was to stay with, and determine his project needs after the 
scoping was completed. Further, during this stage the researcher established connections with 
fisherfolk who subsequently participated as key informants.   
During the scoping visit the researcher was made aware of two important factors that 
subsequently impacted the data collection process. The first was the impending National 
Elections on the 7th May. The proximity of the elections and the presence of the researcher in 
Lamberts Bay led community members to believe the researcher was a government official 
involved with distributing fishing permits, and consequently they were eager to engage. 
Others associated the presence of a ‘government official’ as a threat to the rights they 
currently held and hence were reluctant to engage. The community further associated the 
researcher’s demographic, as a Black male, with a particular political party, the African 
National Congress (ANC).  In addition, the researcher’s assistant was a vocal supporter of the 
ANC and had been involved in the liberation struggle during his younger years.  
Therefore, while piloting the household survey the researcher was constantly required to 
reinforce his position as a Masters student from the University of Cape Town (UCT) and 
dismiss any notions of political affiliation. Utmost transparency was therefore critical and all 
survey documentation was clearly labelled as affiliated with UCT.  The researcher initially 
used his car to get around the community while piloting the surveys. However, he 
subsequently resorted to conducting the surveys on foot because the car acted as a potential 
barrier between his work as a researcher and the way in which the community perceived him.  
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The second important factor beyond the control of the researcher was the Snoek run. The 
researcher began the pilot study soon after the fishers recorded consistently large volumes of 
Snoek. In addition, the pilot was conducted while the town was preparing for an influx of 
tourists during the Easter Holidays in mid-April; a time when the fishers earn higher prices 
per Snoek because of the increased demand both locally and throughout the Western Cape. 
This meant that most of the fishers maximised their time at sea during the day, and those 
involved in post-harvesting were equally as busy.  
The Snoek run however provided the researcher with valuable insight into the fisheries 
process in Lamberts Bay, including the economic relationship between the fishers and those 
who bought their fish, the various actors involved in the fishing process and the workings of 
the value chain covering pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest activities. The Snoek run 
ultimately made it impossible for the research assistant to arrange a community-wide meeting 
to introduce the project to the community, which meant the researcher and the research 
assistant spent more time introducing the project individually and in smaller informal groups 
in the community.  
3.2 Household Survey 
The household as a unit of analysis is appropriate because it is considered the most basic 
socio-economic unit for people with a subsistence livelihood (Branch, et al., 2010). Despite 
some fishermen operating independently of family connections, for purposes of this survey 
the household was defined as ‘those who pool resources and share consumption’ (Branch, et 
al., 2010). The household unit is employed by other economic datasets and hence is 
compatible with national census data. A fluent Afrikaans-speaking translator was required as 
a research assistant because the researcher had a limited comprehension of Afrikaans.  
The household survey was the most important source of information that provided a profile of 
‘small-scale’ fishers and their households. Its purpose was to provide statistical estimates of 
the characteristics of the target population group, from the same set of people (Floyd J. 
Fowler, 2009). To achieve that, the research aims designated small-scale fishers as a subset of 
the population from which information was collected. It is estimated there are 300 self-
identified small-scale fisher households in Lamberts Bay, ten percent of which we wanted to 
include in our survey. The fundamental premise governing this method was that by 
describing the population sample who responded we could infer identical characteristics of 
the target population (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009), in this case the small-scale fishers of Lamberts 
Bay.  
In identifying the households, this thesis relied on snowball sampling. The research assistant 
had extensive knowledge of both the West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holder (WCRLRH) and 
Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers and aided in identifying households in which surveys 
were conducted. The researcher also relied on the individual WCRLHs and IRP fishers to 
identify other fishers with their respective permits, and their availability. However, due to the 
existing tensions surrounding rights holders and non-rights holders, it was suggested to the 
researcher that caution be exercised in talking to certain rights holders who might be 
unwilling to engage with the researcher. In addition, intra-community dynamics meant that 
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the researchers association with the research assistant was not apolitical, in that community 
alliances existed beyond the knowledge of the researcher, which was expressed in the 
reluctance of the research assistant to visit certain homes of rights holders in particular. 
Subsequent to piloting the surveys, the researcher adjusted the questions to suit the needs of 
this particular research by omitting certain questions and including new ones directed at the 
aims and objectives of the research (see Appendix A). The final surveys were conducted from 
the 27th March to the 3rd of April. The fishers of Lamberts Bay became increasingly busy 
leading up to the Easter weekend and many were not present in their households during the 
day. As a result, many surveys were conducted in and around the community streets, at the 
harbour where the fishers landed their catch, and in common meeting places which included 
certain households. The households and the harbour where the majority of interviews took 
place were mapped with the help of the research assistant using print-outs obtained from 
Google Earth, as shown in Figure 6 below. 
 
There are two significant issues with the household survey approach: the first is determining 
the degree to which the answers accurately capture and measure the characteristics described; 
the second concerns how well the sample of respondents is reflective of the target population 
(Floyd J. Fowler, 2009). Finally, the manner in which the information was handled was 
paramount to the ethical standards of the research. To this end, the researcher maintained 
confidentiality and anonymity during the data collection process. By severing the link 
Figure 6: Location of households and other areas where interviews occurred (Nthane, 2014) 
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between a household and its responses, it therefore became impossible to associate 
respondents with their surveys (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009).  
3.3 Focus Groups 
A focus group gathers qualitative information from individuals who had shared similar 
experiences and similar situations (Stewart, et al., 2007). Focus groups are especially useful 
for investigating issues that are considered sensitive and difficult to discuss in a public space, 
for example people’s views on local politics and the respective exercising of that authority 
(Stewart, et al., 2007). The focus groups provided information on the pertinent themes the 
household surveys brought up. The questions focused on particular issues that affected the 
different fisher groups in the community. The intention of the focus group was to elaborate 
on themes drawn from the experiences of ‘typical’ local fishers during the household surveys. 
From the surveys, two groups of fishers were identified for separate focus groups: Interim 
Relief permit holders and near-shore commercial rights holders.  
After a preliminary analysis of the household survey, the researcher returned to Lamberts Bay 
to conduct focus groups with the two groups of fishers: Interim Relief Permit holders and 
near-shore commercial West Coast Rock Lobster Right (WCRLR) holders. The fishers 
experienced an unusually long Snoek run lasting four months. The researcher’s focus groups 
coincided with the last few days that the fishers returned with significant Snoek harvests. 
This provided an opportunity for the researcher to observe the dramatic exodus of fishers and 
their crewmen who left Lamberts Bay to pursue Snoek in other waters along the coast. With 
the end of the Snoek run in Lamberts Bay, the fishers turned their focus to catching Cape 
Bream. As a result the community and the harbour were far less busy than the researcher 
experienced during his earlier data collection processes. With the assistance of the father of 
the family he was staying with and a research assistant, the researcher successfully arranged 
focus group meetings with IRP fishers on the 9th July and with WCRLRHs on the 10th of 
July.  
3.4 Key Informant Interviews 
A research interview is an interview in which knowledge is constructed through the 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale, 2007). Moral and ethical 
issues permeate interview research. The researcher obtained informed consent for 
participation in the study and ensured confidentiality and anonymity primarily by maintaining 
anonymity through all stages of the interview process (Kvale, 2007). Key informants are 
people whom others consider extraordinary and usually occupy positions of responsibility 
and influence. The greatest advantage to a researcher using the key informant technique is the 
ability to collect high quality data in a comparatively short period, in contrast to questionnaire 
surveys (Marshall, 1996; Tremblay, 1957). In addition, interviews allow the researcher to co-
create meaning with the interviewees by reconstructing perceptions and phenomenon 
observed by the researcher (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). The key informants for this 
research were selected based upon the positions of authority they held relative to the fishing 
community, and also for particular characteristics; for instance, so few women were near-
shore commercial rights holders, that it became imperative to include at least one woman 
from this sector as a key informant.  
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The researcher conducted five key interviews in total. They included the sole near-shore 
commercial rights holder who was part of the organisation that represents interim relief 
permit holders, a woman with a near-shore commercial right, a member of the four-member 
local co-management committee, a member of an NGO that represents small-scale fishers 
nationally (Masifundise/Coastal Links), and finally an IRP fisher husband and wife. In 
addition, while the researcher conducted household surveys, he took the opportunity to 
engage in informal discussions with the respondents, which allowed the researcher early 
insight into issues not directly addressed by the household survey.  
The fieldwork was conducted at various stages between March 2014 and August 2014 
through surveys, interviews, focus groups, informal interviews, and a community feedback 
meeting. The fishers in the community were receptive to the research and the respondents 
were willing to share their time and information with the researcher. In total, 44 household 
surveys were conducted, in addition to five key informant interviews, two focus groups, and 
one feedback meeting. The sampling strategy utilized in this research is representative of the 
broader fishing community of Lamberts Bay. Data on precise figures of the WCRLRHs and 
IRP fishers was hard to come by. The researcher therefore relied on the data issued by the 
local representative of the national fisher organisation, Masifundise, which stated there were 
119 IRP fishers and 90 WCRLRHs. The researcher was therefore able to establish that he 
surveyed 26% of the IRP fishers (n=31), and 11% of the WCRLRHs (n=10), figures well 
representative of the broader fishing community of Lamberts Bay.  
 
Table 1: Dates of the data collection process 
Data Collection 
Tools Number Date 
Scoping Visit 1 4th-5th March 
Household Surveys 44 27th March 2014- 4th April 
2014 
Key Informant Interviews 5 2nd-4th July 
Focus Groups 2 9th-10th July 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Quantitative and Qualitative 
The data collected from the household surveys was organised and analysed using Microsoft 
Access, Microsoft Excel, and NVivo. The researcher developed a database in Microsoft 
Access in which all the household surveys were captured. By subsequently using a function 
called “PivotTables” in Microsoft Excel, the researcher linked the survey database in 
Microsoft Access with Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets. This allowed the researcher to explore 
the relationships in the survey and discover whether certain variables correlated with one 
another. Following on from this, the researcher produced graphs and tables that highlighted 
the relationships he felt were particularly pertinent for his study. Those relationships 
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represented on the graphs formed the basis of the focus groups. Further themes for discussion 
were drawn from queries run in NVivo and the Microsoft Access database.  
The qualitative data gathered from focus groups and key informative interviews was input 
into Microsoft Word. The interviews and focus groups that were voice recorded were 
transcribed into Microsoft Word. Where Afrikaans was spoken it was translated into English 
with the help of the research assistant. A number of informal interviews and personal 
conversations were recorded in the researcher’s note book but did not warrant transcription 
into Microsoft Word.  
3.6 Research Considerations 
This Master’s dissertation forms part of a wider project that attempts to build profiles of 
South Africa’s many fishing communities. The project is primarily aimed at, first, 
establishing a livelihood profile of fishing communities along South Africa’s coast, and 
secondly, investigating their response to particular stresses or the development of new 
community dynamics as a result of government policy adjustments and management 
interventions. For instance, similar studies within the Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU) 
housed in UCT have been conducted in fishing communities investigating the impact of 
MPAs on the livelihoods of fisherfolk, another has tracked the impact of the banning of 
traditional fishing gear, and currently a study is underway to determine the importance of 
‘by-catch’ to food security. The project aims to update the study by Branch et al. (2002) that 
presented insight into the socio-economics and livelihoods of subsistence and informal 
fishers in South Africa.  
The project therefore demanded a degree of standardisation, particularly for the household 
surveys which were used to assess the socio-economic profile of the Lamberts Bay fisher 
community. Several specific questions and themes are common across project case study 
areas; however, the researcher originated specific questions that were unique for the research 
that was conducted in Lamberts Bay. The researcher was responsible for adjusting the 
standard general household survey and for its piloting, which was duly conducted in 
Lamberts Bay. With the help of staff from Masifundise Development Trust, an NGO active in 
organising the fishers in the community, the researcher was provided with a research 
assistant. 
The research assistant grew up in Lamberts Bay and hence was instrumental to the data 
collection process, in particular, the household surveys, focus groups, and the mapping 
exercise. Of key importance was the research assistant’s ability to speak both Afrikaans and 
English fluently, his extensive knowledge of the community, insight into the nuanced 
attitudes towards current fisheries governance among the fishers, and his ability to assist in 
the data collection process. In addition, the research assistant was part of the co-management 
structure in the community which acts as the liaison between the fishers and the government. 
As a result, the researcher benefited from the in-depth insight into the community offered by 
the research assistant.  
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For the majority of the fieldwork, the researcher was fortunate to be welcomed by a family in 
Lamberts Bay, of which the father worked with an NGO active in the fisher community, and 
was a previous fisher himself. Living with the family provided the researcher with access to 
the father’s insights and profound knowledge of the nuances within the fisher community, 
which were essential to understanding the complex relationships amongst the fishers.  
Self-reflexivity was a particularly important process to the researcher because the study dealt 
with issues sensitive to individuals; in addition, the researcher was seen as an outsider to the 
Lamberts Bay community. It was important therefore, at every step, for the researcher to 
critically evaluate his relationship with the community and the implications for the data 
collection process. The experiences and perceptions of the people that were studied therefore 
formed a fundamental basis for understanding the livelihoods of the Lamberts Bay fishers. 
Through this, every concept discovered in the research process was highlighted because it 
was repeatedly present in the interviews and surveys, or similarly, it was repeatedly absent 
when it was expected to be present (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
3.7 Research Ethics 
The researcher obtained permission to conduct the research from the Faculty of Science 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town. The researcher was cautioned 
about the sensitive nature of the study and directed to uphold the associated ethical standards. 
The researcher paid particular attention to the requirement of appropriately informing the 
research respondents before seeking consent, and ensuring the integrity of the anonymity of 
the household survey respondents.  
The fishers in Lamberts Bay would be characterised as poor and vulnerable. Vulnerability is 
defined as: “the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with 
environmental and social change and from the absence of the capacity to adapt” (Adger, 
2006, p. 268). Ethical principles that apply to larger groups such as communities are intended 
to protect the dignity, integrity, confidentiality and the rights of the people who compromise 
them (Gostin, 1991). Informed consent is a pre-condition for any ethical research because of 
the intrinsic value of individual autonomy (Schuklenk, 2000).  
Communities are also aware of the fact that researchers collect data on impoverished people 
without contributing to the alleviation of that problem, while themselves profiting incredibly 
both professionally and certainly economically (Nama & Swartz, 2002). Researchers are 
generally privileged, while their research subjects exist in conditions of severe deprivation 
and are among the most vulnerable (Benatar & Fleisher, 2007). Indeed, researchers benefit 
much more than any single research participant. The researcher therefore sought to look 
beyond the focus on informed consent and concentrate on the implications of the research for 
the community (Benatar, 2002). In addition, the researcher attempted to affirm the right of 
members of the community to participate as partners in the research that generated 






Figure 7: Post-harvest cleaning and salting facility (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 4: Background and Context of the Study 
4.1 South African Small-Scale Fisheries 
In South Africa, the desire for poor fishers to have increased access to fisheries, and the 
creation of an enabling environment to achieve transformation, were important drivers of 
democratic reforms within the fisheries sector after 1994 (Isaacs, 2011). At the exclusion of 
the black majority, the capture fisheries of the mid-20th century were supported in their 
efforts to tap into the world markets, and reaped substantial economic benefits for the white 
English and Afrikaner capitalists (Van Sittert, 2002). Yet this opportunity was restricted to 
white fishermen. Hence the current distribution of economic benefits from fishing is grossly 
skewed, with poverty occurring adjacent to riches, and this occurring clearly along apartheid-
era racial classifications (Bavinck, et al., 2014).  
With the proverbial ‘winds of change’ blowing through apartheid South Africa in the late 
80s, the apartheid state commissioned an investigation (The Diemont Commission, 1985) to 
assess quota allocations of marine living resources, their transferability, permissibility of new 
entrants, degree of transformation based on race, and finally stability measures for the 
industry (Isaacs, 2006). The Commission made two recommendations: the establishment of a 
Quota Board to manage existing rights and allocations, and a statutory body to oversee future 
allocations. This resulted in the promulgation of the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988, and the 
institution of the Quota Board in 1990 as the earliest measures seeking to broaden the 
participation of the marginalised into South African fisheries (Isaacs, 2011). 
4.2 Post-apartheid fisheries reform 
Between 1990 and 1998, under the Quota Board’s mandate, national government began to 
address the inclusion of historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) in the fishing industry. 
In an effort to equitably distribute the benefits from fishing, government began reforming the 
legislation of the 1940’s that had facilitated white fishing monopolies (Van Sittert, 2002). 
These reforms consisted of Fishermen’s Community Trusts (FCTs), and various Section 21 
companies (non-profit). Both of these initiatives were short-lived. They lacked transparency, 
accountability, and representation (Isaacs, 2006).  
The FCCs poor regulation allowed local elites, commonly teachers and lawyers who 
possessed superior formal education, to benefit from rights allocations primarily meant for 
the poor fishers. The failure of the FCCs had profound impacts on the psyche of the fishers, 
and in particular their trust of government-led interventions. Mistrust among fishers is high 
and many are rightfully concerned about the authenticity of those with fishing rights. Poor 
fishermen remained marginalised as the process was exposed to elite capture (Sowman, et al., 
2014).  
According to Isaacs (2011) the creation of the Fisheries Policy Development Council (FPDC) 
in 1996 heralded a new approach to fisheries management. The FPDC focused on equity, 
sustainability and stability; however, it did not sufficiently address concerns over access and 
long-term rights of marginalised fishers. The FCTs indicated a move towards community-led 
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fisheries resource management. However, these nascent structures fell prey to 
mismanagement and were abandoned in favour of the ITQ. 
4.3 The Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) 
As of 2014, post-apartheid fisheries rights allocations had endured distinct phases. These 
included the Quota Board from 1994 to 1998, the MLRA from 1998 to 2000, the MLRA with 
the new allowance for subsistence allocations from 2000 to 2001, the medium-term rights 
allocations (MTRAs) from 2002-2006, and the Long-Term Rights Allocations (LTRAs) from 
2005 until 2015 (Isaacs, 2006). The Marine Fisheries White Paper of 1997 was the precursor 
to the MLRA; it emphasised job creation and economic growth. Once promulgated a year 
later, the MLRA institutionalised the ITQ allocation process, which by definition meant that 
many fishers would again be excluded (Isaacs, 2011).  
The MLRA categorized fishers either as commercial, recreational, or subsistence. Artisanal, 
informal, and small-scale fishers were bundled together with subsistence fishers, which 
Isaacs (2006) disparagingly refers to as a ‘one size fits all approach’.  Perhaps the most 
critical passage of the MLRA was section 18(5) which expressly stated that access rights 
should necessarily benefit ‘historically disadvantaged sectors of society’. This passage was 
contested because, according to Isaacs (2006), it officially included any HDI regardless of 
fishing history (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The fishing communities were therefore 
negatively affected because the Act neglected their long-held ideas of what it meant to be a 
bona fide fisher and, by extension, deserving of fishing rights. Under the MLRA, the small-
scale fishers found themselves in a perennial struggle to be recognised as legal fishers, in 
which bona fide fishers were constantly defending their rights to harvest marine resources.  
The MLRA did, however, introduce a new subsistence fisher category to specifically 
recognise fishers marginalised by apartheid legislation and the post-1994 management 
ambiguities. Government recognised its incapacity to manage the category and therefore 
established the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) in 1999 (Sowman, 2006; Branch, et 
al., 2002). The SFTG set about redefining the meaning of subsistence so that only genuinely 
poor, vulnerable, and food-insecure fishers qualified; this prevented them from being 
crowded out by the commercial fisher categories (Witbooi, 2006). The SFTG defined 
subsistence fishers as:  
“…poor people who personally harvest marine resources as a source of food or to sell them 
to meet the basic needs of food security; they operate on or near to the shore or in estuaries, 
live in close proximity to the resource, consume or sell the resources locally, use low-
technology gear (often as part of a long-standing community-based or cultural practice, and 
the kinds of resources they harvest generate only sufficient returns to meet the basic needs of 
food security.” (Branch, et al., 2002, p. 475).  
However, this narrow definition excluded previously subsistence or artisanal fishers who sold 
their harvest commercially. To remedy this oversight, the ‘small-scale commercial’ fisher 
category was included (Sowman, 2006). However, admitting to its parochial focus, Sowman 
(2006) added that the methods employed by the SFTG failed to acknowledge the socio-
25 
 
cultural practices of subsistence fishers, neglecting to take into account their complex array of 
livelihood strategies. Meanwhile, the MLRA sought to include marginalised fishers in the 
formal fishing sector by issuing annually allocated fishing rights from 1999 (Branch & Clark, 
2006). However, the spectacular failure of the annual rights centred around the financial 
insecurity of allocating rights on such a precariously short-term basis. Consequently, after 
numerous legal challenges to the previous dispensation, applications for ‘medium-term 
rights’ were instituted, with a view to allocating longer term rights for up to 15 years from 
2006 (Branch & Clark, 2006). 
4.4 Medium-Term Rights Allocation 
The South African Government introduced the first multiple-year rights allocation in 2001, in 
which the MTRA Fishing Policy was implemented. The MTRA allocated ITQs for a period 
of four years (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2006). This policy dealt 
primarily with commercial enterprises and the allocation of 22 commercial species to them, 
while excluding the majority of traditional, small-scale, and artisanal fishers (Sunde & Isaacs, 
2008).  
In repetition of previous institutional oversights, the redistribution process was subject to 
elite-capture once again. In addition, the process spawned the paper quota holder 
phenomenon in which quota holders effectively rented out their quota allocations and their 
right to fish (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2006). Attempts to 
transform the fisheries were also met with strong resistance by apartheid-era incumbent right 
holders, because they were now forced to compete against new black entrants (Van Sittert, et 
al., 2006).   
4.5 Long-term Rights Allocation 
South Africa’s second attempt at multiple-year rights allocations occurred During the 
2005/2006 season. However, the LTRA was plagued with procedural issues that made it 
especially burdensome for small-scale fishers. For instance, fishers were required to form co-
operatives and hence compete with established and long-running white-owned companies in 
the inshore zone, the communication was conducted in English while most fishers only spoke 
Afrikaans, and the applications did not take into account the formal education deficit among 
many community members. These procedural barriers were once again enough to exclude the 
majority of bona fide fishers (Isaacs, 2011).  
While some authors suggest socio-political imperatives took precedence in the first decade of 
fisheries reform, in reality it appears environmental and economic considerations were the 
primary beneficiaries (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Isaacs, 2006; Van Sittert, et al., 2006). With the 
next allocation phase occurring after 2015 and possibly in 2020, the LTRA process was the 
last possibility for the South African Government to transform the most lucrative sectors, 
such as the hake deep-sea trawling and Lobster sectors (Ponte & Van Sittert, 2007).  In 
addition, armed with evidence of an irregular allocation process, litigation in 2013 that served 
the interests of previously advantaged fishers succeeded, jeopardising the government’s 
attempts to conserve the resource and transform the sector (Underhill, 2014; Sesant, 2014).  
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4.6 Equality Court Order 
In light of the marginalisation of small-scale fishers during the rights allocation under the 
MLRA, a class-action suit was launched against the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism in 2004. The key applicants were the Artisanal Fisher Association and Masifundise 
(with the support of academics, and lawyers from the Legal Resource Centre) (Isaacs, 2011). 
Government had failed to recognise the small-scale sector and the failure to allocate adequate 
fishing rights was a violation of fisher’s Constitutional rights, resulting in incredible hardship 
(Sowman, et al., 2014). The Court Order therefore declared:  
“New policy and legislative process needed to be developed by all parties concerned that 
would include all traditional fishers in South Africa and accommodate the socio-economic 
rights of these fishers.” (High Court of South Africa, 2007)  
The Minister signed the Court Order in 2007, which bound the Department to developing a 
new legislative and policy framework accommodating small-scale fishers in South Africa. 
This meant that fishers who had previously only received exemptions were to be recognised 
as full rights holders (Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). This process culminated in the Draft Policy for 
the Small-Scale Fisheries Sector in South Africa, 2010. Further, as part of the court order, the 
Minister was required to provide an immediate reprieve for the traditional small-scale fishers 
who could demonstrate a family history of dependence on fisheries resources in the form of 
IRPs (Shanyengange, 2010). Restricted to the Western Cape, the IRPs temporarily broadened 
the rights of small-scale fishers to harvest species such as yellowtail and snoek, as well as 
permitting limited harvesting of selected inshore resources (Shanyengange, 2010).  
4.7 Small-Scale Fisher Policy (SSFP) 2012 
The aim of the Small-Scale Fisher Policy is to:  
 “provide redress and recognition to the rights of the small-scale fisher communities 
in South Africa previously marginalised and discriminated against in terms of racially 
exclusive laws and policies…in order to fulfil the constitutional promise of 
substantive equity” (Sowman, et al., 2014, p. 36; Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, 2012, p. 10).  
In response to the limiting definition of small-scale fishing put forward by the SFTG as 
described earlier, the new policy recognises that small-scale fishers harvest along a use 
spectrum. Consequently, the policy describes small-scale fishers as:    
“…persons that fish to meet food and basic livelihood needs, or are directly involved 
in harvesting, processing or marketing of fish, traditionally operate on or near shore 
fishing grounds, predominantly employ traditional low technology or passive fishing 
gear, usually undertake single day fishing trips, and are engaged in the sale or barter 
or are involved in commercial activity” (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2012, p. iv).  
The policy states the “ecosystem” approach is central to fisheries management, and adds that 
the policy has adopted a “community-based co-management approach (Department of 
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Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 4)”.  However, an autonomous idea of 
‘community’ has never existed along the west coast (Van Sittert, 2003). Nonetheless, this 
paradigm shift in management approach evolved from the consistent plea of fishing 
communities and their desire for inclusive marine resource management approaches. In many 
cases, however, fisheries co-management has been unsuccessful, the only real successes the 
redistribution of power and responsibility amongst different stakeholders (Bene, 2009).  
The SSFP identified four principles that determined the new management approach: first, the 
principle of preferential access to small-scale communities with historic livelihood 
dependence on marine living resources; second, the policy adopted a multi-species approach 
in allocating rights, recognising the basket of marine resources that sustains fisher 
livelihoods. (More on this principle: management approaches commonly encouraged a 
single-species approach to harvesting; however, recent developments indicate a basket 
species approach offered greater social and ecosystem outcomes (Kolding & Van Zwieten, 
2011). Third, the policy aims to manage the Small-Scale Fisheries sector through a co-
management approach, but as with other governance systems, co-management involves risks, 
principally, the manipulation of power by local elites (Bundy, et al., 2008). Co-management 
is suggested to work best when there is strong local leadership, social cohesion, and a 
community managed protected area (Gutierrez, et al., 2011). Finally, the policy subjects 
marine living resources management to sustainability precepts, as well as maintaining the 
integrity of broader ecosystems (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 
11).  
4.8 Conclusion 
The ITQ as a rights-based management tool has weakened the influence of fishers and 
increased unemployment and the overall insecurity of fishers. The poor fishers carry much of 
the burden of this management approach, yet they are supposed to be the primary 
beneficiaries (Hara, 2013). The participation of small-scale fishers and the various 
stakeholders is therefore essential, but this requires an interventionist approach from 
government to develop the appropriate management skills among the fishers (Hara, et al., 
2013; Proches & Bodhanya, 2014). Repetition of past scenarios that gave rise to paper-quota 
holders and inadequate processing facilities are important failures DAFF needs to rectify 
(Bailey, 2013).  
The policy holds the potential to make significant progress in addressing the varied causes to 
poverty. However, this recognition is tempered by the realities of the monumental 
implementation effort required to successfully roll out the policy over the next decade 
(Sowman, et al., 2014). The new policy paves the way for future reforms that address issues 
of justice and race-based oppression, in addition to reallocating aquatic resources equitably 
(Ratner, et al., 2014).  
Most importantly for this research was the irregular allocation of fishing quota by the South 
African Government; the result of which was externally imposed income inequality (Visser & 
Burns, 2013). By benefiting a small elite over those with legitimate claims to a livelihood 
from fishing, the allocations divided fishing communities (Visser & Burns, 2013). The 
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resultant levels of mistrust by community members towards each other, and towards formal 
governance structures, was the departure point of this thesis. This context provided the 
backdrop against which the research sought to understand the livelihoods of fisher groups in 
Lamberts Bay and the implications for the implementation of the new small-scale fisheries 
policy.  
  
Figure 8: Fisher boats of different capacity and engine size returning from sea (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the data collected in Lamberts Bay. The resultant data 
is drawn from the household surveys, focus groups, and key informant interviews as declared 
in the Methods chapter. The overall aim of the research was to gain an understanding of the 
livelihoods context of fisher groups in Lamberts Bay in order to determine the implications 
for the implementation of the new small-scale fisher policy. It was important to understand 
the socio-economic context of the fishers, of which the household surveys were a key 
component. The focus groups and key informant interviews were used with the intention of 
revealing the perceptions of the different fisher groups in Lamberts Bay, especially 
concerning their needs and expectations of the new policy. The West Coast Rock Lobster 
Right Holders (WCRLRHs) and the Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers constituted the two 
different fisher groups that served as the lens through which the data is presented. The 
chapter will show that the primary difference between the two fisher groups was the type of 
fishing right or permit they held, which had implications for the marine resources harvested 
and their resultant incomes. These differences are shown to be critical to the development of 
household differences of the two fisher groups.  
First, the chapter presents the demographic data collected through the household surveys, as 
shown in Table 1. This is followed by data that identifies key points of difference and 
similarity that help clarify the household livelihood context of the different fisher groups. The 
chapter then goes on to address the natural assets and resource base of the fishers and 
provides a profile of the marine resources harvested by the fishers in Lamberts Bay and their 
relative importance to food and income needs. The chapter further explores the physical 
assets held by the Lamberts Bay fishers, and identifies stark differences between the fishers 
in terms of their fishing assets. Finally, the chapter describes the perverse financial 
relationship between the Lobster exporting companies and the fishers, which was common to 
both fisher groups.  
5.1.1 Identifying the Lamberts Bay Small-Scale fishers 
Forty-four households were surveyed during the course of the data collection period. The 
overwhelming majority of the fishermen surveyed self-identified as ‘Coloured’. Many 
respondents took issue with the apartheid race classifications and chose to identify as ‘Other’, 
‘Brown’, or ‘Khoi’. The national census records reveal that 76.37% of the total Lamberts Bay 
population self-identified as ‘Coloured’ (Statistics South Africa, 2014). This complements the 
findings from the household surveys conducted for this research which showed that 65% of 
the respondents self-identified as ‘Coloured’. The surveys were conducted within the 
Apartheid-designated area for Coloured people; consequently, other racial categories are 
underrepresented in the results. This included the White small-scale fishers in the historically 
White areas, and the Black fishers who lived in the ‘Kampong’ (‘the camp’ in the Sesotho 
language): a tiny informal settlement adjacent to the Coloured area.  
WCRLRHs were approximately a decade older (average of 53) than the IRP fishers (average 
of 45); in addition WCRLRHs had the oldest person among both fisher groups of 71 years 
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old. The youngest among both fisher groups was an IRP fisher of 29. All fishers occupied a 
very mature age bracket. Both the WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers spoke Afrikaans as their 
first language. The language data shows congruency with the census data, which indicates 
that 90% of Lamberts Bay residents self-identify as Afrikaans speakers. This is followed by 
isiXhosa and English in third (Statistics South Africa, 2014). 
 
Table 2: Demographic Profile of the Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fishers 
 
 
5.1.2 Marine Resource Use 
The WCRLRH right and the IRP were differentiated by the marine resources harvested and 
the regulations surrounding the harvests. The IRP allowed the fishers to legally harvest four 
different species: Lobster, Snoek, Cape Bream, and White Mussel, as shown in Table 3 
below. Attached to these species were regulations that determined the quantity the fishers 
were allowed to harvest and their liberties regarding what they could do with their harvest. 
For instance, for every other species, the fishers could sell their harvest privately or consume 
it in the home. Whereas with the Lobster, the fishers could only sell to the Lobster exporting 
companies with whom they were required to sign contracts. The WCRLRH right on the other 
hand, was limited to the harvesting of one species: Lobster. For every other resource, the 





Group IRP WCRLRH 
Population Group (%) (‘Coloured’) 65% 60% 
Home Language (%) 100% Afrikaans 90% Afrikaans 
Marital Status (%) (Married) 68% 100% 
Birthplace (%) (Lamberts Bay) 77% 80% 
Years in Lamberts (Average) 40,6 50 
Age (Average) 45,8 53,4 
People in Household (Average) 4 5 
Number of People in School 1 1 
Housing Structure (%) (Permanent House) 81% 100% 
Cooking Energy using Mains Electricity (%) 97% 100% 
Drinking Water (House Connection) 94% 100% 
Household Breadwinners 2 2 
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Table 3: IRP Marine Resource Use 
 
5.1.3 Type of employment in fisheries 
The two fisher groups could more or less be defined in terms of two interrelated factors: the 
jobs they performed within the small-scale fisheries and boat ownership. In this respect, the 
individual quota (IQ) right allocation process created a class of boat owners and a class of 
boat assistants. All the WCRLRHs indicated they were boat owners, in contrast to only 42% 
of IRP fishers. Almost half of the IRP respondents, at 45%, stated they were assistants on 
other’s boats. This data showed a distinction between the IRP fishers and the WCRLRHs 
according to their fishing asset base and ownership of the means of production, with an 
intermediary class of IRP fishers who had their permits for a longer period of time and could 
therefore afford boats. Two key informants attested to the development of a pseudo-class 
structure among the fishers:  
“KI3: …and suddenly a situation have unfolded…, if you could say, the one is 
becoming the boss, other one is becoming the worker, and the worker was now, in 
terms of the livelihood, depending on what we call, the site [job as boat 
assistant/crewman], on a boat of a rights holder [WCRLRH]. So that was very 
magnificent, it actually have disturbed the peace and the harmony in the community.” 
“KI2: …see it divides the people, the quota system of that time, and even it divide the 
communities. Now they are like a bourgeoisie now, and the other fishers are like the 
local fishers, and they doesn’t have money and so on, so it discriminates against the 
bona fide fisher now. But he forget that he was on the same level as that guy, but now 
he got a right [WCRLRH], he like a Boer now, like a boss.” [Own emphasis added] 
Furthermore, the IRP holders who worked as boat assistants worked on boats owned by other 
IRP fishers, but more importantly, also on boats owned by the WCRLRHs, which reinforced 
the class distinction between the fisher groups. According to the survey data, the intermediary 
class of IRP fishers who did own boats had acquired their permits with the first introduction 
                                                          
2 Price fluctuates according to the present demand. The spike in Snoek demand immediately preceding the 
Easter holidays is a boom time because the prices reach their season’s maximum.  
3 Seven or 8 fish tied together by the fishers and sold as a bundle. Price ranges according to demand, size, and 
quantity. 
Interim Relief Permit 
Resource Quota 
restriction 
Price (2013/14) Recreational permit  Use 
Lobster 138Kg/season R200/kg No SELL ALL 
Snoek 60/day R20-R95/Snoek2 No MAINLY 
SELL 
Cape Bream 30/day R120/bossie3 No MAINLY 
SELL 
White Mussel 50/day R0.50 No BAIT 
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of the IRP allocation system in 2006 and 2007. The IRP fishers who were boat assistants had 
acquired their permits anywhere between 2006 and 2010. The context is different for the 
WCRLRHs, who were granted their fishing right allocations in 2005 according to the Long 
Term Rights Allocation (LTRA) for a secure ten-year period. This translates to a period of 
ten years in which their income was, for the most part, consistent, and relatively high 
compared with the IRP fishers’. Further, it granted the WCRLRHs the opportunity to plan 
ahead for the next nine seasons to maximise the benefits from harvesting, which included 
investing in boats, gear, and equipment. The WCRLRH’s 606kg allocation of Lobster in 
contrast to the IRP fishers’ 138kg was the chief determinant of the material differences 
between the fishers. The different fisher groups can therefore also be classified along their 
physical assets data, considering that all the WCRLRHs are boat owners, and about half of 
the IRP holders are boat assistants, with an intermediary boat-owning IRP fisher class, as 
shown in Figure 9 below: 
 
 
5.1.4 Fishing as a Cultural Identity 
In contrast to what the researcher expected, a significant proportion of fishers from both 
fisher groups are first-generation fishers. That is, their parents were not involved in the 
fisheries sector. Sixty-eight percent of IRP fishers and half of the WCRLRHs indicated their 
parents were not involved in fisheries. Of the fisher parents who were involved, the majority 
were employed in paid, shore-based fisheries jobs such as Lobster processing facilities, trap-
making factories, and other fisheries support services. This has profound implications for the 
identity of the fishers in Lamberts Bay who jealously guard their fisher authenticity.  
Parents’ involvement in fisheries was considered an important determinant of the fisher 
identity for both fisher groups. The fishers who stated their parents were involved in fisheries 


















Figure 9: Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fisher Class Structure 
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their employment history in the fisheries sector was enough to self-identify as a bona fide 
fisher. The reasoning behind fishers’ consideration of themselves as bona fide small-scale 
fishers is significant. Members from both fisher groups expressed their animosity towards 
fisherfolk who were granted Lobster rights or the IRP, but of whom the respective 
respondents believed were not bona fide small-scale fishers: 
 
“Only fishermen can get the permit - not fishermen from a white man's garden, a 
'kasual'4. At the potato factory they ask for your blue overalls to check - but fishermen 
don’t get asked - you only see at sea that someone can't fish. A gardener is not a 
fisherman.”(LBN24) 
 
“CFG3 : there was one guy on the television I heard in St. Helena Bay, who said that 
he’s catching the Lobster for a person in Johannesburg, for a businessman.” 
For both fisher groups, early entry into the fishing industry was an important marker of their 
identification as bona fide fishers. One fisher remarked: “fishing runs through my blood” 
(HS13), while another stated he was “born with a line in his hands” (HS6).   The majority of 
fishers from both fisher groups began harvesting marine resources before the age of 16. The 
fishers who began fishing at the ages of 15 and 16 stated they had left school to enter the 
formal employment sector. There were significant overlaps in try to differentiate between 
fishing as occupation, and fishing casually during their youth.   
5.2 Social and Human Assets 
5.2.1 Household profile of Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fishers 
The WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers registered very similar numbers of people residing in 
their households.  IRP fishers had on average 4.4 people per household, whilst WCRLRH had 
on average 4.9 household occupants. In contrast to the average household size for the 
Cederberg Municipality at 3.3 persons per household (Municipality, 2012), Lamberts Bay 
fishers have relatively high numbers of household residents. For both fisher groups, the 
average number of breadwinners was two. This commonly consisted of a husband and wife 
partnership, but in some instances, adult children who remained in the household were 
included as breadwinners. The breadwinners in the households of both fisher groups in 
Lamberts Bay carry a greater household burden and have to allocate their income among 
more people than other households within the Municipality.  
The data showed very little difference between the housing structure of the IRP holders and 
the WCRLRHs. All the WCRLRHs indicated they lived in permanent brick structures, with 
81% of those with IRPs indicating the same. IRP holders were the only respondents to 
indicate they lived in any structure other than a permanent house, with a small minority that 
stated they lived in permanent shacks and traditional dwellings. The Lamberts Bay housing 
problem was peculiar in that large numbers of its residents were backyard dwellers, some of 
whom were small-scale fishers. None of the houses had been constructed within the tenure of 
the Long Term Rights Allocation (LTRA) or the allocation of the IRP, as the majority 
                                                          
4 Afrikaans word translated as ‘casual’ in the English used in reference to casual laborers.  
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appeared to have been constructed during the government’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP)5.  
With the exception of two IRP fishers, all the fishers from both fisher groups stated their 
households had household electricity connections. Mains electricity was also the most 
common cooking energy among both fisher groups, with the exception of one IRP fisher who 
stated they used LPG Gas for cooking, and another who prepared his food in a family 
member’s household. Similarly, all the fishers from both fisher groups stated they had access 
to piped water in the household, with the exception of two IRP fishers, one of whom also had 
no electricity connection.   
5.2.2 Level of Education 
The level of education is shown in Table 4 below. The following description highlights the 
education problem among the small-scale fishers of Lamberts Bay. The table shows that 
significant numbers of fishers from both fisher groups did not proceed further than primary 
school, and among those, very few completed primary school. The data also shows that of 
those who enrolled for primary school education, more IRP fishers failed to complete, in 
contrast to WCRLRHs. The survey did not, however, explore the reasons for this early 
departure from the formal school system. This data shows that among those whose education 
ended at the primary level, more dropped out than finished, which has enormous 
consequences for the literacy and numeracy of the fishers.  
The data shows that the two fisher groups had difficulty progressing in high school. Half of 
the WCRLRHs surveyed had not completed high school, compared to 42% of IRP holders 
who also did not complete high school. These results show that the IRP fishers and the 
WCRLRHs are both burdened with the problem of education. One of the priority areas 
identified by the IDP is the need for a secondary school in Lamberts Bay (Municipality, 
2013).  Currently parents are forced to send their children to boarding schools in the nearby 
towns of Graaffwater and Citrusdal for schooling beyond Grade 9: just one amongst the 
myriad and overlooked Apartheid legacies affecting the community.  
Table 4: Schooling Statistics among Lamberts Bay Fishers 
 
                                                          
5 A paradigmatic social welfare programme adopted by the post-1994 government that had a significant housing 
focus.  
Level of Education 
Education IRP WCRLRH 
Incomplete primary 29% 20% 
Completed Primary 10% 10% 
Incomplete high school 42% 50% 
Completed High School 16% 10% 
Completed Tertiary 3% 10% 
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5.2.3 The Primacy of Fishing as Livelihood Strategy 
Both fisher groups stated marine resource harvesting was their primary means of income and 
food source. WCRLRHs also indicated the importance of self-employment and employment 
in the fishing industry, which some indicated as their most important income-generating 
activities. Figure 10 shows that some WCRLRHs were employed in the trap-making factories 
of Lobster harvest and export companies. This was important because IRP fishers were not 
legally allowed to perform another occupation outside of marine resource harvesting, while 
some WCRLRHs considered their permit as part of a range of business opportunities they 
could exploit as any other. For both fisher groups, where the wife worked outside of the 
fisheries sector, she was commonly employed in the town’s potato factory (previously a fish 
processing plant) or fulfilled a variety of services for the White patrons in the town including 












Fishing was also the most important contributor to the household income among the IRP 
fishers. The WCRLRH households showed a similar dependence on marine resource 
harvesting, with 77% who considered marine resource harvesting as their largest and sole 
income source.  Within these same categories, however, the data shows that more WCRLRHs 
were able to consider marine resource harvesting as their sole income source, while IRP 
fishers had to rely on a wider range of income activities.   
Due to the income differentials, WCRLRHs feel they are wrongly perceived as wealthy, as 
evidenced from this WCRLRH focus group:  
“CFG1: They see 606 [kilograms] 
CFG4: Times 200 [R/kg of Lobster]- 
CFG1: …they don’t see the real part  
Figure 10: WCRLRHs working a second occupation as trap-
makers (Author, 2014) 
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CFG3: …50 000 rand you got in your hands but it isn’t like that, you got deductions 
on it.  
CFG4: See us, I fish November, now I fish December, and I fished January for 
Lobster, I didn’t catch all of my allocation, but I can tell you now with an honest face, 
I don’t have any money left. I have done a few things, I don’t have any money left.” 
WCRLRHs expressed dissatisfaction with the community perceptions surrounding the value 
of their permit and their relative wealth, in particular against that of those fishers without 
rights as well as those with the IRP. Table 5 below shows the potential earnings from marine 
resource harvesting in a perfect season (November to June). Linefish clearly proves a far 
more lucrative resource to the IRP fishers than their Lobster quota, even more so than that of 
the WCRLRH quota. However, the IRP fishers’ disproportionate focus on harvesting their 
Lobster allocation, in addition to structural factors that render Lobster a source of easily-
accessible disposable income, results in the IRP fishers forfeiting this potentially lucrative 
marine resource. 
Table 5: IRP vs WCRLRH Projected Earnings before costs ('13/'14 Season) 
 
5.2.4 Food Security 
The most important marine resources of both fisher groups were Lobster and Snoek. These 
marine resources were however attached to conditions and obligations which the fishers were 
required to fulfil. For instance, both fisher groups had to sell their Lobster to Lobster 
exporting companies, and this was policed by the fisheries department. Due to the high prices 
received per kilogram of Lobster and the ease with which Lobster provided disposable 
income, both fisher groups declared Lobster the most important resource to their income. The 
attractive short term gains from Lobster harvesting deflected attention away from the far 
more lucrative Linefish the fishers could harvest. The Lobster harvest promises the fishers a 
consistent income because they sell what they catch directly to the Lobster exporting 
companies as per agreement. However, Linefish harvesting is both inconsistent with respect 
to the migratory nature of Snoek, and also requires a thriving local market in order for the 
fishers to benefit from their harvests. Snoek prices are also incredibly sensitive to demand. 
The few bumper holiday periods provide welcome relief over prolonged periods of muted 
demand. The importance of these two variables to maximising Linefish harvests renders 
Lobster the most attractive marine resource to harvest. Snoek, for which the WCRLRHs 
could only receive a recreational permit, was considered the most important resource for 
household food provision.   
The data also showed that 81% of the IRP fishermen stated they engaged in fishing to meet 
the direct food needs of their households. In contrast, the majority of WCRLRHs stated their 
PERMIT TYPE IRP WCRLRH 
SPECIES LOBSTER SNOEK CAPE 
BREAM 
LOBSTER 
QUOTA  138,00kg 420/week 210/week 606,00kg 
AVG PRICE  194,68kg 47,95/fish 112,83/bossie 194,68kg 
TOTAL (SEASON) R 26 865,84 R 483 336,00 R 81 237,60 R 117 976,08 
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marine resource harvest does not serve the direct food needs of the household. In addition, 
the WCRLRHs considered the Linefish as surplus to their income from Lobster, which more 
often than not exceeded the income from catching Snoek and Cape Bream. The different 
fishing patterns and incomes therefore developed explicit food security differences, as 
evidenced by the IRP fisher below:  
“…one needs to accept their circumstances - you don’t have meat every day, on the 
day, only have coffee and bread - some days you are frustrated that your neighbour 
[referring to WCRLRHs] can have all they want and you can’t.” (LBN23) 
 
The differences in income between the IRP and WCRLRHs had further consequences for the 
food security of the respective households. An overwhelming majority of WCRLRHs 
indicated they never skipped a meal during the month before the surveys were conducted, in 
contrast to half of the IRP fishers who stated they had skipped a meal in the previous month.  
Eating fish on Mondays was considered a Lamberts Bay tradition among the Coloured folk, 
and according to the respondents, this was a Sunday tradition for White folk. For both the 
WCRLRHs and IRP households, fish was an important part of the household diet. The 
WCRLRHs stated they consumed fish at least once a week, while all the IRP fisher 
households consumed fish at least twice a week, with some consuming fish more frequently. 
Apart from directly harvesting Linefish, some households received fish through an informal 
network based on friendship, kinship, or mutual reciprocation beyond friendship. The fishers 
who returned from sea set aside a few Snoek to give away for these purposes, which they 
called the ‘fry’, either to take home for the household or for friends and family waiting on 
shore. Both sets of households therefore depended on the Linefish as an important part of 
their household diet.   
5.2.5 External Support Structures  
All the survey respondents from the two fisher groups had social support systems outside 
their immediate families, in the form of local fishing committees. Different committees 
existed to serve the interests of the IRP fishers and the WCRLRHs; these were Coastal Links, 
and the Sea Management Committee, respectively. Membership of a committee was 
important as an indicator of social capital and alternative support external to kinship. Both 
fisher groups stated they were satisfied with the performance of their respective fisher 
committees. However, some of the WCRLRHs lamented the lack of communication with 
their committee and the poor state of transformation with the majority of the decision makers 
being White. It appeared the WCRLRHs are default members of the Sea Management 
Committee by virtue of their Lobster permit.  Consequently, they are largely removed from 
the operations of the committee but continue to pay rates to it.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
5.2.6 Profile of the Household Occupants 
The data shows that 100% of the WCRLRHs and 68% of those with the IRP indicated they 
were married. The survey did not include co-habiting couples, despite there being cases in 
which IRP holder fishers lived with their partners. Due to the younger profile of the IRP 
holders, it was expected that fewer would be married in comparison to the older group of 
38 
 
WCRLRH. It is, however, important to note that although the WCRLRHs are on average 
older, both the fisher groups have high average ages, as the data indicates.  
The fisher groups have relatively large households and, as a result, the expectation was that 
they would have household members of school-going age. While the average number of 
people attending school in both IRP and WCRLRHs households was equal at one, households 
of IRP holders had a higher maximum number of school goers, at four, in contrast to the 
WCRLRH households, at three. Problematically, 32% percent of IRP fisher households 
recorded no school-goers at all, whilst all but 1 WCRLRH household had someone in school. 
Overall, then, proportionally more WCRLRH households have a member of their household 
enrolled in school in contrast to the IRP fisher households with less.  
5.3 Natural Assets and Resources  
5.3.1 Lobster and Snoek central to the SSF livelihood 
According to the fishers, Lobster was the most popular target for poachers, followed by 
Snoek. This was because Lobster was highly valued on the local and international markets, 
and for which a large black market trade existed. Both fisher groups stated that Lobster was 
too expensive to be consumed in their household. In addition, the fisheries department had 
made it illegal for fishers to sell any of their Lobster privately. Lobster was therefore not seen 
as a food source but rather as the most important source of household revenue. While few 
IRP holders regarded Snoek as their most important income source, the importance of Snoek 
to the IRP holder’s household income is significant. Despite the potential for Snoek to 
generate far greater income than Lobster harvesting, as Table 5 above shows, the 
disproportionate focus on the short-term gains of the Lobster harvest means this is very rarely 
the case. The extended 2014 Snoek run for instance, which ran for four months, provided the 
opportunity for the IRP fishers to earn more from their Snoek than their season’s Lobster 
allocation, which was more the exception than the rule. The same could not be said for the 
WCRLRHs for whom income from Snoek harvesting (which they could only harvest with a 
recreational permit) remained far below their income from Lobster harvesting, and, hence, 
was far from being the most important income resource. The pattern that has emerged 
revealed that WCRLRHs and IRP fishers depended on Lobster more than any other marine 
resource as a significant part of their income.  
Both fisher groups ranked Snoek as the most important marine resource for food. Ninety-six 
percent of IRP fishers identified Snoek and Cape Bream as their primary food sources. 
WCRLRHs could only harvest Linefish with a recreational permit which they had to 
purchase from the Post Office. While some WCRLRHs bought the recreational permit, it 
appeared as a mere formality because they harvested beyond the recreational quota’s 
allocation, while some WCRLRHs didn’t bother with a permit at all. The fishers stated the 
compliance officers at the harbour were traded Snoek and other species in return for leniency.  
WCRLRHs therefore had less access to Linefish because of their permit restrictions and this 
meant their dependence on Linefish was less than that for IRP fishers. For six months of the 
year WCRLRHs were preoccupied with harvesting their Lobster quota, while IRP holders 
were not required to divide their attention to such a great degree because of their much 
smaller Lobster quota.  
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5.3.2 Threats to the Marine Resources 
The results have so far shown marine resource harvesting contributed to the household 
income and food needs of both fisher groups. It was important therefore to determine the 
perceived threats to the sustainability of this livelihood. The results showed that both groups 
unanimously regarded climate change and poachers as the greatest threat to the marine 
resource. Other factors were less prominent but were important to some fishers, such as the 
impact of commercial company trawlers and, in particular, their commercial traps that 
damaged the live Lobster in the WCRLRH near-shore harvest zone. Other outliers some 
fishers considered threatening included over-fishing, type of gear, and market demand. With 
respect to climate change, both fisher groups elaborated on the importance of sea temperature 
to the availability of marine resources, in particular Lobster. The pattern points to the 
similarity of fishing experiences, despite the different rights and permit specifications. 
The majority of references to poaching made by the fisherfolk were directed towards Lobster 
harvesting. To the fishers, Lobster poaching included harvesting more than the right or permit 
allowed, as well as launching during the night to poach from the traps of the commercial 
Lobster companies further out at sea. The fisherfolk further revealed Linefish poaching was 
prevalent, with Snoek the main target species. Both fisher groups implicated themselves in 
poaching of these species. The survey did not investigate the reasons fishers poached, but in 
conversation, both groups of fishers revealed their dissatisfaction with their Lobster quota 
allocation, and, for the WCRLRHs in particular, the limited opportunities with a permit that 
only allowed Lobster harvesting. Even so, the WCRLRHs described Snoek harvesting as an 
important supplement to their diet and income, especially during the winter months:  
“CFG4: ‘Cos most of us don’t have…commercial Linefish rights, so what we are 
actually doing, we are going out and you stealing, because that is what you do and we 
use that money to get by. When the Snoek runs like it did now [apropos of the 4-month 
extended run], but it’s not that sustainable because you don’t show that much of a 
profit. It’s an every day, it’s from day to day. And if you weren’t successful every day, 
then you can put a little of that money aside, when the winter really hits us, then it’s 
gonna be very bad.” 
Despite unanimously revealing poaching as a problem, the respondents felt they were 
compelled to poach because their current rights and permits were not sufficient to maintain 
them. Neither fisher group pointed fingers, but rather spoke of poaching as a problem within 
their respective allocation system.  
5.3.3 Perceptions of the new community right 
When asked about their perceptions regarding the community right that was to be introduced, 
the WCRLRHs stated the policy was good for the fishing community in general, but saw 
themselves as apart or outside the policy. The WCRLRHs were however very aware that the 
new policy had profound implications for their fishing livelihood, particularly due to the 
impending 2015 rights allocation process. However, most were unambiguous in their desire 
to remain with their current individual permit, and saw the introduction of a community right 
as the potential loss of their autonomy and privilege. WCRLRHs suggested that while they 
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welcomed the new policy into the fishing community, they would much rather remain with 
their individual permits: 
“T: so when it comes to it, it says that, you have a choice between the near-shore and 
joining the community right. What would happen there? What would you feel you 
would do?  
CFG1: I think that’s an individual [decision], if you think that you will perform for 
the past ten years, what is the hold on applying again? So, what’s the problem?”  
The majority of responses from the WCRLRHs indicated their disdain for joining the new 
policy. Among the dilution of their autonomy and independence, another important factor 
was the relative income differences between the IRP holder and the WCRLRHs based on 
their lobster harvests. The income from the Lobster quota allocation is significantly higher 
than that of the IRP holders and remained the key motivation to retain such a lucrative 
permit. 
One respondent doubted the sustainability of the new policy and suggested that as his key 
reason for preferring his individual permit. Another WCRLRH felt mistrust between the 
fishers was his biggest concern with the new policy, in addition to the potential 
mismanagement of the implementation of the policy. For the WCRLRHs, the critical issue 
raised by the majority of the respondents and reiterated repeatedly in interviews, surveys and 
focus groups, was the anxiety brought about by their uncertain position once their rights 
expire after their final harvesting season, and the allocation process scheduled for 2015. One 
WCRLRH believed he was sure to lose his fishing right, the implications of which made him 
anxious:  
“CFG4: Ya, we gonna be left in the desert without water. That’s how it’s gonna be. I 
don’t think, I would say 98 percent of people in the near-shore fisheries [WCRLRHs] 
don’t have a backup plan. Because what you do, you’ve been fishing all your life and 
it’s the only thing that you knew, and some of the guys is coming much older by now, 
they are set in their ways, what is for them to do?” 
The potential that the WCRLRHs might not retain their current permits during the 2015 
allocation process, and the quantity of their quota allocations if they did retain their permit 
(considering the steady decline in Lobster allocations to allow more entrants), drive this 
uncertainty. In addition, WCRLRHs felt they were not engaged in the formulation of the new 
policy. The somewhat sarcastic and rhetorical question below asked by a WCRLRH 
highlighted the insulation the WCRLRHs felt regarding the new policy:  
“CFG3: Are we involved in this new policy? As the near-shore small-scale fishers?” 
Unfortunately, the fisheries department failed to adequately conduct the 2013 Linefish 
allocations, which made the fishers lose confidence in the 2015 process. Data collected from 
news feeds suggested the fisheries department will be ill-prepared to conduct the 2015 
allocations because of a backlog in the necessary preparatory steps. In addition, the 
WCRLRHs felt the department had not engaged with them enough to give them an indication 
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of their post-2015 future. The WCRLRHs felt they had not been part of the formulation of the 
new policy:  
“KI3: no, at that time it was only the fishers without the rights [IRP fishers] who were mostly 
attending the meeting. Because the rights holders [WCRLRHs] have argued that this is not 
for them, they are sitting with rights.” 
“CFG4: you see the new policy was, I believe that the new policy was set up in consultation 
not so much with us, the near-shore guys [WCRLRHs]; this new policy was mainly driven by 
the Interim [IRP fishers], the subsistence fishers and they forwarded their agendas. Because 
they felt that they want to have what we [WCRLRHs] have and all that stuff.” 
Only one WCRLRH from Lamberts Bay participated in the discussions and meetings around 
the new policy. Some respondents felt the WCRLRHs perceived themselves as a separate 
group among the fishers because of their privilege, and that the policy discussions were 
beyond their concern as WCRLRHs. The data showed the WCRLRHs had very little 
knowledge regarding the contents of the new policy and were simply awaiting their fate. One 
key informant laid bare the tension between the fisher groups and their sentiments:  
“KI2: That is the kind of difference between those two rights holders, the commercial 
[WCRLRHs] one not certain about his livelihood after 2015, while Interim man [IRP fisher] 
said that now this is his time to eat.” [Emphasis added] 
The WCRLRHs also expressed their dissatisfaction with the current size of quota allotted to 
them. One WCRLRH described his sentiment as such:  
“CFG1: My point of view, it’s not sustainable… 
T: Not sustainable. 
CFG1: If you are just depend on the 606 [kilograms], because why? As he said, your 
levies, they deduct your levies, your maintenance, you pay your crew. You know 
what? The change is yours. “ 
The anxiety over the 2015 rights allocations was also due to the uncertainty over the quota 
allocations that will be allotted to the rights holders should they retain their permits. In 
addition to the dissatisfaction with the current quota allocation, the fishers felt the department 
could reduce their Lobster quota without consultation, as had occurred in previous years.  
5.4 Access to finance 
5.4.1 Advances 
Both the WCRLRHs and IRP holders had taken out advances from friends, family, or from 
the Lobster exporting companies to cover their household expenses such as food, clothes and 
school fees. These figures were high, at 70% for the WCRLRHs and 68% for the IRP 
holders. In addition, the fishers mentioned they often required initial capital to launch their 
boats each season, to purchase sea-going equipment, and other start-up items. The advances 
were a quasi-legal arrangement between the fishers and the exporting companies. They were 
quasi-legal because they thrived under the full knowledge of the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF), yet at the same time the fishing companies do not have the 
required authority to extend their services to financial credit provision.  
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By Departmental decree, the fisher groups were required, to enter into contracts with the 
Lobster exporting companies to whom they were bound. However, in order to secure the 
quota allocation of the fishers, Lobster export companies offered competing incentives to the 
fishers in order to entice them to sign with the respective exporter. These incentives 
commonly came in the form of competing loans to the fishers, and the offer of a better price 
for the fisher’s Lobster. However, fishers were adamant that the key to the success of the 
fisheries lies in assuming control of the exporting, which remains in the hands of the 
established and historically White companies, as a WCRLRH describes below:  
“CFG2: and due to the fact that the resource is limited that everybody can’t be 
accommodated in the resource, we must really look at the marketing, because the 
marketers [Lobster exporters], are actually the guys who walks away with the money, 
if that money can be can be channelled to the real fishermen, that will make a whole 
lot of difference...” 
While this arrangement appeared to grant both fisher groups some degree of autonomy and 
leverage over which company they selected as their exporter, and by extension the potential 
to negotiate better prices for themselves, this was seldom the case. Instead, the exporting 
companies recruited influential members of the fishing community to peddle loans to the 
fishers prior to the opening of the Lobster season. This coincided with a particularly 
vulnerable period for the fishers who experienced rough seas during the winter and could not 
earn money by going to sea, as well as the impending festive season and the associated 
expectations placed on breadwinners to provide for the family. Repaying the loans to the 
exporting company was fulfilled by delivering all their Lobster quota for that particular 
season to the exporter, effectively reducing the fisher to little more than an indentured servant 
and replicating the apartheid-era bondage that the small-scale permit allocation sought to 
rectify.  
5.4.2 Co-operatives and their challenges 
Co-operative membership differed across the fisher groups. Of the surveyed IRP holders, 
81% were members of co-operatives. The IRP holders were required to form co-operatives in 
order to receive infrastructure support from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Key 
items for each co-operative included 2 boats, safety equipment, amongst other forms of 
support. WCRLRHs operated with a greater degree of individual autonomy because they 
were not required to form co-operatives. However, some WCRLRHs stated they had formed 
co-operatives as a strategic manoeuvre against the threat of losing their individual right in the 
2015 allocations. 
5.4.2.1 Challenges 
The greatest challenge with the co-operatives was the low level of co-operation between 
members of the same co-operative. Commonly cited grievances were that members absolved 
themselves of the responsibility of going to sea, leaving the burden of harvesting their catch 
on the shoulders of the remaining members. Other members limited themselves to the less 
strenuous activities in the post-harvest sector, such as ‘flekking’ and cleaning the fish, while 
some co-operatives had experienced members who left to join other co-operatives. IRP 
respondents also elaborated on the economic burden of absentee co-operative members. It 
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was often stated that underperforming members continued to seek economic benefits from the 
co-operative, despite not contributing to the running of the co-operative. 
The fisherfolk continued to support inactive members because they regarded themselves as 
fishers before they were businessmen, implying kinship and community assumed precedence 
over economic decision-making. Fishers regarded the perceptions of the community as an 
important factor in how they responded to the conduct of underperforming members. One 
example given was of a fisherman who passed away. The deceased’s family approached the 
cooperative for financial support to pay for the funeral. However, unbeknownst to the family, 
the fisherman had not been an active contributing member. Despite this, the cooperative was 
compelled to contribute to the family because acting otherwise would be seen as an immoral 
and unfeeling act by the community. The consequence was that most of the co-operatives 
were defunct and mistrust among the co-operative members remained high.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the results that were obtained from the household surveys, the focus 
groups, key informant interviews, and personal notes. The data shows the WCRLRHs and the 
IRP fishers shared a common upbringing, and engaged in similar fishing activities before the 
introduction of the ITQ. They harvested similar marine resources and were limited by similar 
constraints that affected their educational and occupational opportunities. Despite this, the 
data shows the rights allocation process created a group of fishers with higher income, 
depending on whether they held the WCRLRH permit or the IRP.  As a result, key structural 
differences developed in Lamberts Bay. These structural differences fostered divisions within 
the fishing community clearly visible at the household level. These divisions manifested 
themselves in household food security differences between the WCRLRHs and the IRP 
holders, and the ability of the IRP fishers to own a share of the means of production such as 
boat infrastructure.  
The boat ownership patterns revealed the emergence of two distinct classes and a third 
intermediary: a boat owner class, a boat assistant class, and those who fell into both 
categories. The boat owner class was populated by all the WCRLRHs and some of the IRP 
fishers, while the boat assistant class consisted entirely of IRP fishers and those without any 
form of permit. The intermediary class consisted of IRP fishers who had the IRP permit long 
enough to allow investment in boat infrastructure, but who also worked as boat assistants. 
Boats were in overwhelmingly short supply. The people who got into the 2005 commercial 
rights allocation were able to invest in a vessel. Those excluded from that earlier allocation 
are only just recently obtaining DTI support or loans from marketers. Overall, there is a 
distinct lack of licensed vessels amongst those who missed out on the 2005 allocations.  This 
control over the means of production, such as fishing boats and associated harvesting 
necessities lay overwhelmingly with the WCRLRHs, while meagrely distributed amongst the 
IRP fishers.  
Boats were the most important physical assets that made up the SLA asset matrix. Owning 
boats meant fishers had access to greater credit lines, became employers with the opportunity 
to pursue other business, and gave them a significant advantage when re-applying for fishing 
44 
 
rights. Through this, boat owners entrenched their wealth, enabled by an allocation process 
that rewards incumbents. Finally, the chapter described the financial assets at the disposal of 
the fisher groups, describing the prevalence of advances, and the largely defunct co-
operatives, particularly among the IRP fishers. Both fisher groups stated the prevalence of 
advances contributing to community decay and mistrust between the fishers. Even worse was 
the fact that advances stripped the fishers of any autonomy over their Lobster, which was also 
their most important resource. The consequence was that the fishers were effectively reduced 


















Figure 11: 'Langanas' waiting to purchase fish from returning fishers (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Convergent Histories: Social, Human, and Natural Assets 
Small-scale fishing in Lamberts Bay is integrally associated with the culture and the identity 
of the fishers, in keeping with the findings of Bavinck, Pellegrini, & Mostert (2014) who 
concluded the same about small-scale fisheries in the ‘Global South’. This thesis found that if 
either parent of a fisher was a fisher (commonly the father), the fisher was engaged in 
harvesting at a very early age. The nature of this resource harvesting was informal and 
quantitatively insignificant. However, it bore immense cultural importance and affirmed the 
identity of the fisher. All the fishers grew up during apartheid and, as a result, their 
educational aspirations were structurally arrested at the age of 16 with the Bantu Education 
Act (Union of South Africa, 1953). While unable to pursue further education unless under 
exceptional circumstances, the fishers were also restricted from becoming legal rights holders 
under apartheid law. Consequently their involvement in fishing was limited to being 
crewmen for White rights holders, fulfilling their apartheid-designated occupations as 
‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ for White-owned fishing companies (Union of South 
Africa, 1953).  
There was therefore nothing exceptional between the early life histories of the WCRLRHs 
and the Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers. This was also true for the physical structures in 
which both groups of fishers lived. All had access to basic services such as piped water 
connections to the house as well as mains electricity connections. None of the households 
visited had been constructed within the previous nine years, although some had extended 
their structures. The data did not determine whether the houses were constructed by the 
fishers themselves or formed part of the roll-out of the RDP programme. It does appear, 
however, due to the standard structure of the dwellings the researcher visited, that all the 
permanent houses were government granted RDP houses. Consequently, there was little 
difference between the household structures of WCRLRHs and IRP fishers. In the relatively 
short period of nine years since the allocation of the long-term rights, the influence of the 
allocations has been limited with respect to household structure.   
Both fisher groups had remarkably similar numbers of people in the household, in school, and 
as breadwinners.  This consistency confirms that neither fisher group displayed exceptional 
characteristics but rather had very similar life histories. This suggests the household structure 
of the two fisher groups has developed largely independent of the rights allocation process. 
That is to say, the household profiles of WCRLRHs and IRP fishers recorded in the survey 
responses developed independently of the distribution of the respective permits. No 
exceptional differences were evident between the WCRLRH and the IRP fisher groups that 
pointed to the influence of the type of permit they held. Considering the long-term rights 
allocations (LTRA) were issued in 2005 and the IRP soon after from 2007, it might have 
been expected that life histories would be largely similar. While this was true, life histories 
also served the purpose of determining whether they had any impact on the allocation of the 
rights, considering that elites had often been the recipients of fishing rights intended for the 
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poor. This thesis now turns to the differences between both fisher groups that have arisen 
since the long-term rights allocation process. 
The rights allocation processes were a significant factor in the 10-year average age difference 
between the two fisher groups. The IRP is reviewed annually, and in accordance with the 
determined TAC, the department issues permits to new entrants but also exercises the liberty 
to revoke the permits of incumbents. This meant that every year, new entrants, whether 
young or old, became part of the IRP system. In contrast, the WCRLRH system was executed 
through the LTRA process during 2005. This meant that entrants were only allowed to apply 
once, with the next application process due after ten years. As a result, many who might have 
applied for inclusion into the WCRLRH system were not eligible because they were too 
young, while older and perhaps more established fishers applied for the long-term fishing 
rights as eligible persons. There was therefore no room for younger entrants during the tenure 
of the long-term fishing rights unless under exceptional circumstances. The result is that 
WCRLRHs were on average older than IRP fishers.  
Structural factors including the Bantu Education Act, socio-economic hardships and the 
woeful lack of school infrastructure in the area were the reasons the fishers’ education levels 
were low. Lamberts Bay had no secondary school. In recognition of this, a new secondary 
school has been given priority by the IDP (Municipality, 2013). The lack of education 
facilities in Lamberts Bay is an example of the tragic characteristic of small-scale fisheries 
world-over, whom Kolding, Bene, & Bavinck (2014) claim lack access to basic service needs 
including schools.  The new policy proposes far-reaching reforms in the small-scale fishing 
sector aimed at granting the fishers greater autonomy in the management of their resources 
and post-harvest selling and marketing. This highlights the importance of education, over and 
above anything else, as a critical component. While these new functions for the community 
were welcomed, it was also clear the fishers felt inadequate regarding the extent of their 
preparedness for these responsibilities. In particular, the financial skills deficit was 
highlighted as a key concern amongst the fishers. The policy’s support of the post-harvest 
sector was intended to broaden access of the benefits of the policy to those not involved with 
primary resource harvesting. This included women, youth, and those involved in the post-
harvest sector.  
As Figure 7 indicates, the post-harvest sector was the full extent of women’s involvement in 
the Lambert’s Bay fishing sector, with the exception of a few women WCRLRHs. The 
workshop focusing on co-operatives highlighted the prominent place of men even in the post-
harvest sector. Women are already faced with a strong gender bias against them in fisheries, 
as McCay & Jentoft (1996) confirmed. Male encroachment in the post-harvest sector was 
therefore a double blow to the Lamberts Bay women. The workshop indicated male 
encroachment was a consequence of their exclusion from the contentious rights allocation 
process, supporting the finding of Gehab et. al. (2008) and Gordon (2005). Fortunately for the 
men, they have the option of working in every field of the fishery sector very easily, a fact 
corroborated by Goncuoglu & Unal (2011), while very few women, as the interviews 
showed, will choose to work at sea. As incumbents of the lowest position in the social 
hierarchy, women in fisheries face an increasingly oppressive and marginalised existence. 
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The new Policy’s focus on the post-harvest sector remains unequivocally important to the 
future livelihoods of the fishers; however, the policy needs to arrest male encroachment into 
the post-harvest sector to protect the livelihoods of women fishers.   
6.2 The Great Divergence: Income and Food Security 
6.2.1 Income Differences 
Marine resource harvesting limitations created differences between the WCRLRHs and the 
IRP households. This externally imposed income inequality was consistent with Visser & 
Burns (2013) who attributed it to the irregular allocation of fishing quota by the South 
African Government. Further, the implementation of the ITQ system in Canadian fisheries 
convinced Christiansen-Ruffman (2002) of the inequitable differences they produced within 
fishing communities, arguing these differences were artificial and superficial, which also 
holds true in Lamberts Bay.  
Table 5 in Chapter 5 shows the projected incomes from the marine resource harvest by 
fishing right and permit. Harvesting Linefish had the potential to provide far greater income, 
but because Lobster harvesting provided the fishers with access to easily disposable income, 
they dedicated fewer resources to catching Linefish. Lobster therefore gained the most 
attention from the fishers, who considered it their most important marine resource harvest. 
Lobster became the most important resource to both the fisher groups because it generated 
the most income relative to other marine resources. The Lobster quota allocation of both 
groups was of enormous economic consequence as Figure 9 (Chapter 5) indicates. This 
radical division between the IRP fishers and the WCRLRH fishers is in agreement with 
Stewart, Joubert, & Janssen (2010) who found that in South Africa, ITQs created clearly 
distinguishable factions: those who held fishing rights and those who did not.  
The IRP income was less than that of the WCRLRH because of the imbalanced ‘Lobster-
centric’ marine resource harvesting. The IRP fishers depended on their permit to a greater 
degree because they did not (and legally could not) have alternative employment. For the 
WCRLRHs, they could afford to rely on their harvest as their sole income because it was so 
economically valuable. As a result, a contradictory relationship emerged between the level of 
income of the fisher groups and their dependence on their respective right or permit. For the 
IRP holders this meant they had a high dependence on marine resource harvesting, while the 
actual economic value of their permit was relatively low. WCRLRHs had a lower dependence 
on marine resource harvest, yet its value was relatively high. The WCRLRHs relative wealth 
also meant they invested in boat infrastructure when IRPs did not have the means.  
The capacity to invest in boat infrastructure appeared to be the realm of the WCRLRHs as a 
fisher group. This was evident through the boat ownership data. All the WCRLRHs were able 
to purchase boats for themselves, while only half of the IRP fishers could afford them. For 
the IRP fishers who managed to invest in boats, they generally had had their permits for a 
longer period of time and hence could save for such expenses. The IRP was re-issued 
annually and hence those for whom it was their first year with the permit had no means to 
invest in infrastructure. The major implication of this was that the IRP fishers could be at a 
significant disadvantage if they were to apply for commercial rights in the future.  
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The typical commercial rights application process looks at the extent of investment in the 
fishing industry; while the WCRLRH fishers had the means and evidence of their 
infrastructure investment, the IRP fishers had neither. This unfairly disadvantages the IRP 
fishers, while granting the WCRLRHs a better chance of retaining their right. Dispensing IQs 
such as the WCRLR created a small elite (consisting largely of bona fide fishers) who 
benefited from fishing rights allocations; but this also meant that some fishers with a 
legitimate claim to a fishing livelihood were denied access to the fisheries because of the 
limited availability of fishing rights. Visser & Burns (2013) found that benefiting a small elite 
only divided the communities in which rights were disbursed, as evident in Lamberts Bay. 
This finding is corroborated by McCay (1995) and Charles (2013) who found that the 
distribution of ITQs concentrated fishing rights amongst a few, while excluding other 
legitimate fishers and reducing the community’s economic base. 
Boat ownership data also served as the de-facto class distinguisher in the Lamberts Bay fisher 
community. Three identifiable classes existed: a boat-owning class in which all the 
WCRLRHs were present, a boat assistant class which consisted entirely of those with IRP 
permits and those without permits, as well as an intermediary class of IRP fishers who 
managed to buy boats, but who also worked as boat assistants looking for ‘site’6. The annual 
allocation of IRP permits, and the 10-year tenure of the WCRLRHs, meant the class 
distinctions based on boat ownership were rigid. Drawing on communist concepts from 
Engels & Marx (1888), the WCRLRHs monopolised the means of production, in this instance 
fishing gear such as boats. The IRP fishers and those without fishing rights at all, as a 
proletariat unable to own the means of production, resorted to selling their labour in order to 
live.  Fishing boats constitute a fisher’s most essential physical asset, and remain central to 
the fisher’s asset matrix. As Nizamedinkhodjayeva (2007) iterated, a compromised asset set 
(here deficient boat ownership) has far reaching implications for fisher’s livelihood 
sustainability, of which income and the ability to invest in productive activities are the chief 
casualties.  
So far the type of marine resources harvested have been shown to develop class distinctions 
generated from the income differences associated with the rights and permits held by the 
WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers. This created differences in boat ownership amongst the 
fisher groups, contributing to the existence of three different small-scale fisher classes within 
Lamberts Bay. This class distinction paralleled the rights and permits of the two fisher 
groups. While Bavinck, Pellegrini, & Mostert (2014) believe South Africa’s ‘skewed’ 
fisheries economic beneficiation continues to benefit Whites over Blacks, it is also clear that 
on a local scale, the current distribution of fishing benefits has established WCRLRHs as 
local elites within the Lamberts Bay fisher community. As a symptom of the relative income 
differences, household food security contrasts between the WCRLRHs and the IRPs were 
also stark.  
                                                          
6Colloquial term referring to the process of seeking daily employment on a fishing boat as a crewman 
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6.2.2 Food Security 
The household food situation of the WCRLRHs was better than that of the IRP fishers, and 
this was also attributed to the differences in income. WCRLRHs, for instance, never had to 
miss a meal for a lack of food or income in the household. Their quota allocation allowed 
them to meet the basic food needs of their families. The incomes from the WCRLR quota 
allocation was also high enough that the fishers did not need to think of it as the most 
important provision of food. While this is also tied to the fact that the fishers do not eat their 
Lobster because it is worth far more sold than consumed, it also points to the capacity of the 
WCRLR to provide over and above the household food needs. In addition, WCRLRHs were 
known to have invested in boats, pick-up vehicles, and had built extensions to their houses, 
which some fishers noted were the more inconspicuous expenditures. For WCRLRHs, 
household food provision was never a problem they needed to concern themselves with; for 
IRP fishers, however, the food security picture was very different.  
All the IRP fishers experienced concerns around household food availability. Many had gone 
without a meal in the previous month before the survey was conducted, with some missing 
more than one meal a week. In contrast to the WCRLRHs, all the IRP stated their marine 
resource harvest was their primary source of food. In other words, they lived ‘from hand to 
mouth’. The IRP fishers’ dire food security context supports the findings of Brocklesby & 
Fisher (2003) who found that small-scale fishers were particularly vulnerable to food 
insecurity. The IRP fisher’s dependence on marine resources as their primary food source 
was in large part due to the abundance of Snoek and Cape Bream which forms part of the 
IRP’s allowed catch. Most fishers from both groups also stated these species were their most 
important food source out of all the other marine resources they harvested. However, this also 
meant the IRP fishers in particular were susceptible to losing a significant food source in the 
event of natural crises. This relationship between small-scale fishers’ food sources and 
natural disasters is corroborated by the findings of Bene (2009) who highlighted the 
vulnerability of small-scale fishers as a socio-economic group to natural and economic crises.  
6.3 Natural Assets: The Lobster Resource Curse 
That Lobster was bundled with the IRP marine resource allocation had profound implications 
for the fishers. The fishers of Lamberts Bay traditionally considered themselves Line fishers, 
and only caught Lobster as a bonus or for extra cash during the festive season to pay for 
children’s clothing and other household expenditures (KI4, 2014). The pre-eminence of 
Lobster is therefore a new phenomenon ushered in by the relative ease with which Lobster 
provides disposable income, which was tied to the exploitative practices of the large 
exporting companies. As Table 5 above shows, this preoccupation with Lobster is unfortunate 
because the IRP fishers forfeit the opportunity to earn far greater income through their 
Linefish allocations, which under perfect conditions could provide a relatively extraordinary 
amount of much needed income. 
The importance of Linefish as part of the cultural identity of the fishers is underscored by the 
fact that some of the WCRLRHs continue to harvest Linefish, either illegally or with a 
recreational permit. This is because Linefish harvesting remains a part of their small-scale 
fisher identity, having been harvested for generations. As a result of the ‘Lobster-centric’ 
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rights and permit allocations, however, this part of the fisher identity slowly eroded, which 
had detrimental consequences for the concept of community among the fishers and their 
traditional fishing practices. Some fishers, in particular women with IRP permits, only 
harvest Lobster and neglect to harvest Linefish species (KI1, 2014). While this is also due to 
the dangers involved with fishing for Linefish which the women are wary of, Goncuoglu & 
Unal (2011) stated the ease of the Lobster-harvesting process and in particular its ability to 
generate substantial short-term revenue make it the most attractive marine resource to 
harvest. The Lobster allocations have also incentivised inauthentic ‘fishers’ to infiltrate the 
small-scale fisheries sector.  
Some WCRLRHs were late entrants into the fishing sector. This may well be people who had 
no fisher history and seized the opportunity to be included in the fishing right allocations. 
This is important because both fisher groups consider the problem of inauthentic fishers a 
grave concern. IRP fishers and WCRLRHs felt the fishing rights and permits which were 
supposed to be allocated to bona fide fishers, had also been allocated to people they felt were 
not eligible bona fide fishers. The Lobster quota offered a particularly strong financial 
incentive for non-fishers to enter into the small-scale fishing sector, or at least apply for 
fishing rights. Those fishers who considered themselves bona fide fishers and demonstrated a 
history to that effect, also fished for Linefish, which offered crude clues as to the extent of 
fisher’s claims to authenticity; opportunistic people who entered the fishing industry would 
likely not bother themselves with the rough and dangerous work of catching Linefish, 
especially when they held the more lucrative WCRLR. The fisheries department was yet to 
establish mechanisms that ensured only eligible small-scale fishers received rights or permits, 
and had plans to implement a verification system through the early phases of the 
implementation process of the new policy (DAFF, personal communication, 2014). 
According to key informant KI3 (2014), the department will be compelled to accept the 
opportunists who were awarded long-term rights in 2005 as part of the legitimate group of 
small-scale fishers. Inclusion of non-fishers is addressed by Isaacs (2006), who believes 
DAFF remains hamstrung by section 18 (5) of the MLRA that recognises all historically 
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) as eligible beneficiaries of fisheries reform regardless of 
fisher history. However, the policy’s proposed verification procedures offers the opportunity 
for DAFF to honour the bona fide fishers livelihoods, setting fair and just criteria for 
inclusion into the policy. Beyond the direct benefits to the fishers, succeeding in granting the 
rights to those who qualify will have untold benefits for the legitimacy of the entire policy 
and will surely elevate the reputation of the government in the eyes of the fisher 
communities.  
6.4 Financial Assets: Patterns of Dependency and Dysfunctional Co-Operatives 
Lobster fetched high prices because of the vast demand both domestically and internationally. 
The LTRA of 2005 distributed Lobster quota to small-scale fishers to offer them a potentially 
lucrative livelihood source, as well as attempting to transform the fishing industry which 
remained dominated by incumbent apartheid-era fishing companies owned by the White elite 
(Van Sittert, 2002). However, the Lobster exporting companies exploited the poor socio-
economic status of the fishers, by offering the fishers loans honoured through contractual 
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agreements to sell their Lobster quota to the respective exporting company. Some fishers had 
been extended loans from two different exporting companies of which they had to pay back 
with the same amount of Lobster quota (KI3, 2014). Consequently, the IRP and the 
WCRLRHs who had taken out loans from the exporting companies were effectively reduced 
to indentured servitude, hidden behind the veil of relative prosperity and presumed financial 
agency.   
These financial arrangements also reinforced already-existing community divisions. Using 
unscrupulous methods such as enticing members of the locally elected co-management 
committee to use their influence to convince fishers to take out loans from preferred 
exporting companies, these companies actively contributed to, and fed off the community’s 
fracturing. Further, some WCRLRHs were employed as ‘marketers’ and peddled loans to 
these fishers on behalf of the exporting companies. Even though Van Sittert (2003) dismissed 
the idea of the existence of homogenous communities along the West Coast in 2003 (before 
the LTRA), and while the income differences between IRP and WCRLRH already created 
tensions amongst these two fisher groups, WCRLRHs operating as middlemen were 
especially problematic for the IRP fishers because of the existing power asymmetry. 
Replicating age-old colonial divide-and-rule schemes, the exporting companies have 
successfully driven a wedge between the fisher groups, eroding the already slim prospects of 
fisher co-operation. Van Sittert, Branch, Hauck, & Sowman (2006) have already shown how 
fisheries’ transformation has been met with resistance from apartheid-era incumbents; it 
should come as no surprise that externally driven conflicts such as these would proliferate. As 
argued by Gutierrez, Hilborn, & Defeo (2011), social cohesion remains a pillar of successful 
co-management.  
6.4.1 Dysfunctional Co-operatives 
Two structural issues arose with regards to the co-operatives in Lamberts Bay. The first was 
that most IRP fishers were part of a co-operative, whilst most WCRLRHs were not. This 
experience granted the IRP fishers some expertise with regards to operating in co-operatives, 
however, very few of them were actually operating successfully, with the majority either 
dysfunctional or idle. Common reasons were distrust among the fishers and an inability to get 
along. Another concern was the free-rider problem in which benefits from the co-operative 
were distributed evenly among members, whilst few punitive measures existed to act as 
disincentives to free-riding.  
The second structural concern was that these co-operatives were instituted at the behest of the 
DTI as the only entities they gave infrastructural and financial support to, avoiding the 
challenges of issuing benefits to individuals. The DTI also aided the fishers in the process of 
establishing co-operatives and as a result, almost all the IRP fishers found themselves in non-
operational co-operatives. Some fishers in co-operatives were not fishers that could meet the 
criteria of the new policy, and hence bona fide fishers were in co-operatives with those who 
might not qualify as small-scale fishers under the new policy. The new policy’s verification 
process will therefore need to take this into account, either continuing to work with the co-
operatives as they stand, or overhaul the entire co-operative process and create new ones 
reflective of the goals of the new policy. As Isaacs (2006) showed, intra-fisher mistrust has 
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its roots in the failed FCTs and the early fisher beneficiation attempts by government. The 
failure of co-operatives therefore has the potential to reinforce the idea that community co-
operation is a hopeless goal, however imperative.  
Adopting the framework of the SLA approach, it is clear the Lamberts Bay community is 
riddled with complex issues across the human, physical, natural, social, and financial capitals. 
Figure 12, overleaf, depicts the progression of the small-scale fisher sector from the divisive 
effects of IQs to the new SSFP that seeks to bring all the small-scale fishers together. Before 
this discussion turns to recommendations, a summary of the issues follow:  
i. The divisions between the fisher groups are varied. These divisions occur primarily 
across income and food security. This despite the history shared by the fisher groups 
that preceded the allocation of the fishing rights. Other less significant issues, yet still 
important, include the age and language differences between the two fisher groups 
which are important for consideration of future allocation processes.  
ii. Both the IRP and WCRLRH fisher groups are plagued with the problem of education. 
The roots of this problem are deep and extend beyond multiple decades. The new 
policy entrusts communities with new roles and responsibilities, where education and 
skills are critically important assets. 
iii. The allocation of the Lobster and the high prices on the international markets, has 
granted Lobster a place within the community it had never historically occupied. This 
has detrimental consequences for both fisher groups who have historically relied on 
Linefish as their livelihood mainstay. In addition, the local markets have subsequently 
been structured to exploit the export of Lobster, at the expense of the fishers who find 
themselves the target of unscrupulous, powerful, and monopolistic apartheid-era 
fishing companies that benefit from the fisher’s financial distress and their fishing 
rights. 
iv. Mistrust amongst the fisher community is especially high; this straddles the 
WCRLRH vs IRP fisher lines, and also prevails amongst members of the same fisher 
group. The new policy’s success demands co-operation amongst the fishers in order 
for the policy-mandated structures to be effective. However, because of historical 
failures at co-operation and the current prevalence of the dysfunctional co-operatives, 




The new small-scale fisher policy represents a progression from diverging interests since the 
allocation of individual rights in Lamberts Bay to the community right where small-scale 
fisher interests have converged. ‘Lobster-centric’ individual rights spawned income and food 
security differences among the fisher groups in Lamberts Bay, effectively eroding the shared 
characteristics of the small-scale fisher community. Yet despite the introduction of individual 
rights, the separate fisher groups have largely maintained a dependence on Linefish and 
acknowledge their common fisher history. The small-scale fisher policy draws on these 
important aspects of convergence culminating in the allocation of community rights under the 








ITQ: Interest Diversion 
CBLE: Interest Conversion 
IRP WCRLRH 




Figure 13: Landed Snoek on the harbour (Author, 2014) 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Overview of the Study 
The overall aim of this study was to understand the livelihoods of the various fisher groups in 
Lamberts Bay and the implications for the new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP). To achieve 
this aim, the following four objectives were identified: 1) Understanding the socio-economic 
context of the small-scale fishers in Lamberts Bay; 2) Assessing the socio-economic 
differences between the fisher groups; 3) Determining the perceptions of the fisher groups as 
regards the new small-scale fisher policy; and 4) Identifying factors that will enable the 
expectations and needs of the different fisher groups to be accommodated in the SSF policy 
roll-out. 
To meet these objectives this thesis adopted the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), 
which focused on five ‘assets’ important for rural livelihoods. These fives assets include the 
social, human, physical, financial, and natural assets which the fisher groups exploited to 
varying degrees. This approach emphasised the need to understand the Lamberts Bay small-
scale fishers holistically and not observe them in isolation from their broader social, cultural, 
political, historical, and economic contexts. 
This thesis employed qualitative research methods to gain an understanding of the small-scale 
fishers and draw out some of the more nuanced data that was important for grasping the 
socio-economic context of the fisher groups. The findings were interpreted through the lens 
of some key concepts contained in the literature surrounding the history of South African 
small-scale fisheries up to the contemporary era embodied by the introduction of the SSFP, as 
well as some of the prominent management tools that had been used to manage the small-
scale fisheries in South Africa. Particularly important, were the principles and objectives of 
South Africa’s new fisheries policy in light of the unique features revealed by the Lamberts 
Bay fishing community.  
Historical as well as new approaches to small-scale fisheries governance were 
comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 2, and provided the theoretical foundations of this 
study. Conventional management approaches which were intended for the industrial fisheries 
were shown to be woefully inadequate for the small-scale fisheries sector, which is riddled 
with substantial social complexities intricately tied to the marine resources the fishers 
harvest. Thus, small-scale fisheries were recognised as requiring management approaches 
that expressed a more nuanced appreciation of the fishers’ livelihood context. Particular 
attention was paid to literature that revealed the myriad negative consequences ITQs had on 
fishing communities, and the development of other management tools that sought to alleviate 
the hardships imposed on communities and move towards more inclusive forms of small-
scale fishery management.  
Concepts from this first section were then linked to South Africa’s own journey of 
transformation in the fisheries which sought to address the legacy created by decades of gross 
racial oppression faced by the small-scale fishers. It was shown that the almost chronic 
failures of the government’s reform attempts entrenched feelings of mistrust in the fishing 
57 
 
communities and, worse, denied many bona fide fishers a right to their livelihood. These 
persistent failures on the part of government culminated in the landmark court case which 
saw small-scale fishers granted IRPs until the new SSFP was drawn up and implemented. 
The small-scale fisheries landscape was therefore altered as fishing rights were irregularly 
allocated in communities. This was the case in Lamberts Bay which has significant numbers 
of those with fishing rights, those with interim relief permits, and bona fide fishers without 
any source of state-sanctioned right to marine resources.  
This set the stage for the following chapters which were an in-depth investigation of the 
socio-economic context of the different fisher groups and their image of the new SSFP. The 
study used a mix of surveys, interviews and focus groups to reveal the intra-community 
dynamics that had developed since the introduction of the long-term fishing rights and the 
IRP, and the tensions resulting from the irregular allocation processes. Taken together, these 
informed a comprehensive understanding of the Lamberts Bay small-scale fisher groups as 
they presently stand.   
7.2 Recommendations 
The new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP) is comprehensive in both its assessment of the 
livelihoods context of the small-scale fishers and the implementation challenges the policy 
will face (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). However, the policy 
document expressly declares its function is not to …“spell out operational details” 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 27), or explain how the proposed 
management system will work in practice. The necessity for a nuanced approach to a 
contextual appreciation of each fishing community is apparent. The wholesale adoption of a 
generic management approach to the implementation of the new policy in fishing 
communities, devoid of recognising the unique features of each fishing community, sets the 
policy up for spectacular failure which DAFF can ill afford. These recommendations serve to 
fill the information deficit characteristic of small-scale fishing communities as identified by 
Bene, Macfadyen, & Allison  (2007) and Kolding & Van Zwieten (2011).  
The new policy has the potential to radically address issues of justice, race-based oppression 
and resource allocation equity (Ratner, et al., 2014); however, this optimism is tempered by 
Sowman, Sunde, Raemaekers, & Schultz (2014) who warn of the immense implementation 
effort required to successfully roll out the policy. In addition, Charles (2013) states that 
community managed rights are entirely unfeasible in areas where communities are largely 
heterogeneous, relatively large, display weak geographical clarity and lack cohesive 
community involvement (Charles, 2013). The discussion has shown the Lamberts Bay fishing 
community has significant elements of heterogeneity and lacks cohesiveness; however, the 
small-scale fishers are bound by a common identity which has endured the relatively short 
dispensation of individual rights and permits. Drawing from the policy’s proposals and the 
findings of this study, this thesis now proposes recommendations to overcome the 
implementation challenges.  
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7.2.1 Capacity Building 
In Lamberts Bay, the focus of capacity building efforts should rest on three important issues; 
the educational deficit, financial upskilling, and infrastructural development. The education 
challenges in Lamberts Bay have their roots in the structural inequalities of the apartheid era. 
Making progress in this area therefore requires interventions that are at once beyond the 
ambit of the policy, and others that speak directly to the current small-scale fishers. While 
infrastructure investments such as the development of a much-needed secondary school and 
associated support may take some years, more immediate intervention options are available 
to the government. These include adult literacy and numeracy programmes. The educational 
challenges in Lamberts Bay are also inter-generational, which has implications for the post-
harvest sector in which fishers have envisaged the younger generations with tertiary 
qualifications leading the charge on the marketing and exporting front. However, this remains 
ambitious considering the lack of the secondary school and the serious challenge faced by 
Lamberts Bay youth being eligible for tertiary education on such shaky foundations.  
Adult numeracy and literacy programmes will go a long way in developing the financial 
acumen of the small-scale fishers. However, more directed financial-skills focused 
programmes are essential if the fishers are to exploit the opportunities provided for by the 
new policy. This task is likely overwhelming for the national government, which makes it 
imperative that government both support and commission NGOs and civil society 
organisations to fill this capacity. NGOs such as WWF have already been involved in local 
level programmes aimed at empowering small-scale fishers. Financial institutions such as 
banks often engage with communities in financial skills development programmes. The 
fishers are likely to take on new financial responsibilities as they expand their operations 
under the new policy, for which more sophisticated financial arrangements will need to be 
configured with these financial institutions. Government therefore need not burden itself with 
some of the tasks required with this type of capacity building, but should entrust already 
existing efforts of NGOs and other civil society organisations to meet the needs of the fishers. 
This view is firmly supported by Ratner, Asgard, & Allison (2014, p. 127) who believe civil 
society will occupy a ‘crucial’ role in what they state is South Africa’s ‘policy experiment’. 
This broad-based approach to small-scale fisheries intervention further entrenches small-scale 
fishing into mainstream public discourse, allowing them a greater platform for which their 
challenges can be recognised and addressed.  
The DTI has made impressive inroads into the fishing community’s infrastructure 
development, however, their efforts have been hamstrung by a lack of communication 
between the DTI and DAFF which has seen the distribution of boats and other equipment 
stalled. The importance of enhancing the capacity of the fishers in their marine resource 
harvests is intimately linked to allowing fishers the ‘multi-species’ approach in which all 
Linefish are legally harvestable with catch restrictions that are deemed legitimate. While all 
Linefish will be available for legal capture, some of the lucrative and more desirable Linefish 
such as Tuna, are found further out to sea; the current capacity of the fishers does not allow 
them to explore these waters. To bring to life the ‘multi-species’ approach it is therefore 
critical that fishers’ boat infrastructure be boosted to overcome the limitations imposed by 
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their current equipment. The distribution of this infrastructure is likely to cause serious 
tensions within the already fractured community. It may be useful for the DTI and DAFF to 
provide infrastructure support subsequent to the verification process and establishment of 
functioning co-operatives, thereby reducing any doubt of the authenticity of those entities that 
receive infrastructural support.  
7.2.2 The Income and Food Security Dynamics 
The LTRA led to the development of income and food security differences amongst the 
small-scale fishers of Lamberts Bay. The IRP was intended to alleviate the poverty of the 
fishers, but, IRP households continued to experience food security difficulties, which has led 
to both relative and absolute problems of food security amongst the IRP fishers. The new 
policy therefore needs to recognise that apart from including those fishers who have never 
held use rights or permits, it must aim, in one policy, to pool together two household fisher 
groups that have important differences between them. The Policy’s rights allocation needs to 
be especially sensitive to the plight of the IRP fishers whichever way the rights allocations 
are distributed to the community-based legal entity (CBLE). Pretending the new policy 
incorporates homogenous groups of fishers would be a grave error that will most likely 
continue to benefit the WCRLRHs with more power and financial resources at their disposal. 
DAFF must therefore pay attention, first and foremost, to organising the IRP fishers so that 
they are the primary recipients of both harvest rights and benefits. It is suggested the policy’s 
extraordinary potential will voluntarily draw in WCRLRHs; DAFF therefore needs to be 
prepared to be advantageous to both groups in the rights to harvest and beneficiation.  
The new policy states that fishers who have been fishing for a minimum of ten years, among 
other criteria, will also be considered for inclusion in the new policy as bona fide fishers 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 38). Fisher authenticity is an 
issue close to the hearts of many small-scale fishers; this criterion in the policy effectively 
recognises opportunistic people who won rights in the LTRA in 2005 (which at their 2015 
expiry, will be a ten-year tenure). The fishers who have benefited off the vastly more 
lucrative WCRLR represent a greater injustice to the legitimate fishers who were denied a 
livelihood by the allocation process. The verification process therefore needs not only to be 
sensitive to the already skewed household differences between the WCRLRHs and the IRP 
fishers, but needs to recognise the double injustice incurred by those  bona fide fishers 
without rights or permits. The importance of the legitimacy of the policy in the eyes of the 
fishers hinges on this all-important verification process.  
The inclusion of WCRLRH fishers into the new policy caused considerable concern amongst 
the WCRLRH fishers themselves, and this was closely tied to the income benefits they 
received from their Lobster allocation, as well as the autonomy granted by their individual 
right. It is already clear that including the WCRLRHs along with the IRP fishers is riddled 
with issues of justice and fairness in light of the historical benefits granted the WCRLRHs; 
however, their inclusion in the policy also needs to reflect fairness to them as small-scale 
fishers considering their present feelings of neglect in the policy’s development. This is in 
agreement with Charles (2013) who also suggests that where tenure rights already exist, it is 
important  to consider the human rights of the fishers who are to be included into the new 
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system, taking into account their cultural and historical situation to ensure they are included 
appropriately.  
While it is not entirely certain whether the WCRLRHs will all be included in the new policy 
as their individual rights potentially fall away or whether their allocations will be 
significantly reduced, it is clear DAFF’s focus is on the success of the new policy.  This 
could mean diverting Lobster quota away from the WCRLRH right towards the new small-
scale policy quota allocations (DAFF, personal communication, 2014). As a result, it is likely 
the WCRLRHs will find it beneficial to be a part of the new policy. Including the WCRLRHs 
will have important implications for their financial situation. Being relatively privileged for 
the past ten years or so with a consistent income, it is important the policy does not pull the 
rug from underneath them by leaving them suddenly with a reduced income. Many have 
invested in boat infrastructure, household appliances, extensions on their houses, and taken 
out loans that could only be serviced with their current incomes. Jeopardising this income by 
inappropriately reducing their quota allocation or compelling them to join the new policy 
may have disastrous effects for their livelihoods. The wholesale inclusion of WCRLRHs 
would be too abrupt; DAFF therefore needs to consider a phased approach allowing 
WCRLRHs to adjust to their new financial arrangement, however it is configured.  
7.2.3 Co-management Committee 
The new policy proposes the establishment of a co-management committee that would 
represent the shared responsibility between the small-scale fishing community and DAFF 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). The co-management committee 
will be tasked with some important responsibilities including fisher verification and the 
subsequent arrangement regarding the allocation of the community right, among others. If the 
current co-management committee is anything to go by, the policy’s implementation is surely 
heading for dire straits. Not only is the committee dysfunctional at present, but it has been 
infiltrated by external interests to serve the ends of the exporting companies, entirely 
destroying its mandate by effectively serving interests inherently opposed to the development 
of the small-scale fishery. The current committee was democratically elected by the fishers, 
yet the persistence of the intra-committee problems has not yet been addressed.  
This points to a lack of recourse in the event the fishers are not happy with the elected 
representatives. The co-management committee stands in an incredibly powerful position, 
and the potential to act as a gate-keeper to settle old scores is not beyond possibility, 
considering the community fracturing. It is therefore imperative that DAFF establishes 
comprehensive institutional support circumscribing its roles, responsibilities, transparent 
dispute mechanisms, and the tenure of elected members, among many other important 
checks, without hindering its functionality. Small-scale fisheries reform processes are prone 
to elite capture as recent history shows, which the fishers have not forgotten. The legitimacy 
of the co-management structure and comprehensive institutional support is therefore critical 
to the success of the policy and needs to occur well before the policy is implemented.  
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7.2.4 Financial Freedom 
The mandatory obligation of the fishers to enter into agreements with the exporting 
companies severely limits the agency of the small-scale fishers over their quota allocations. 
This arrangement requires serious overhaul if the fishers are to be released from their 
debasing position as mere debt-ridden servants of the exporting companies. The new policy 
holds the promise of the fishers being able to finally export their own Lobster under their own 
recognisable label that would market their history and their livelihoods as small-scale fishers. 
However, this will remain a pipe dream until DAFF commits to providing the capacity for the 
fishers to export their products. Until then, the fishers will continue to require the services of 
the established apartheid-era export companies and their far superior exporting facilities. The 
government will need to take a tougher stance to deter the influence of monopolistic capital, 
against the backdrop of its overall neo-liberal macro-economic policy, which Sowman, 
Sunde, Raemaekers, & Schultz (2014) recognise as a significant stumbling block.  
The co-operatives have given the fishers the opportunity to interact with complex financial 
arrangements that are important for the policy’s implementation. Unfortunately, very few co-
operatives could successfully exhibit records that included catch history, associated revenues, 
and bank statements indicating solvency. However, this thesis identified two successfully 
operating co-operatives from the harvest and the post-harvest sectors. DAFF needs to build 
on the experience of these successful co-operatives to inform the policy’s prescribed co-
operative structures. As with other forms of capacity building, NGOs have been more 
responsive than government in providing support services to small-scale fishing communities 
expanding their fishing operations. An example is the WWF’s Fisheries Improvement 
Projects currently exploring ways for fishers to partner with establishments to whom they can 
directly sell their Cape Bream. It is important that DAFF recognises the involvement of other 
actors and functions as a facilitator to other projects such as these.  
7.3 Conclusion 
The discussion tracked the institutional changes that have affected the Lamberts Bay small-
scale fishers since the inception of the individual rights in the fishing community. The 
journey showed the small-scale fishers, while sharing a common history, developed stark 
differences brought on by the introduction of the individual rights in which some sections of 
the community were privileged over others. Household differences emerged amongst the 
WCRLRH and the IRP fisher groups which bore important consequences for their income 
and food security. WCRLRHs were better off from an income and food security perspective 
owing to their relatively lucrative Lobster allocation. The implementation of the new policy 
depends on a significant degree of homogeneity and co-operation amongst the small-scale 
fishers. The development of these differences between the WCRLRH and the IRP fisher 
groups therefore threatens the successful implementation of the policy in Lamberts Bay. 
Consequently, the discussion suggested recommendations that highlighted the particular 
challenges for the implementers of the new policy and ways to overcome these challenges, 
summarized in Figure 14 below. While the issues raised are not exhaustive, they are the 
culmination of months of work in Lamberts Bay and highlight the most important challenges 
that DAFF needs to address to overcome the implementation challenges posed by the 
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Lamberts Bay small-scale fishery. Future fisheries research in the Lamberts Bay community 
must focus on specific implementation challenges centred on fisher co-operatives, giving 
agency to the fishers by liberating the fishers from the exploitative established fisher 
companies, and incorporating the small-scale fishers into the lucrative macro-economic 
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Appendix A- Household Survey 
 
Household Survey Number…… 
 
This survey is for the purposes of a research project conducted through the University of Cape Town.   
Lamberts Bay 
Small-Scale Fishers Survey 
Environmental Evaluation Unit, University of Cape Town  
 
Interview Details 
Date     /       /2014 
Interviewer’s Name Tsele Nthane 
 
Background Information 
1. Gender 2. Age 3. Birth date  
 Male  Female   
 
 4. What population group do you describe yourself as belonging to? 
 Black  White  Coloured  Asian/Indian  Other 
 
5. What language do you mostly speak at home? 
 Xhosa  English  Afrikaans  Other 
 
6. Marital Status 
 Single  Married  Divorced  Widow 
 Widower  Separated  Common law 
 
7. What is your level of schooling? 
 No formal Education  Complete High school Education [finished Gr. 12 or Std 10] 
 Incomplete primary education [between Gr.1 and 
Gr.6 or Sub A to Std 4] 
 Technical/ College Education 
 Complete Primary education [finished Gr.7 or Std 
5] 
 University Education 
 Incomplete High School Education [between Gr. 8 
and Gr.11 or Std 6 and 9] 
  
 
8. Where were you born? 













10. How many people live in your 
household/homestead?   
 
11. Number of people in school?  
 
12. Housing structure 
OBSERVE and indicate what is the MAIN material used for the MAIN dwelling 
 Traditional dwelling (mud brick, clay, dung, wattle)  Permanent house (brick, block) 
  Temporary shack (plastic, cardboard, plywood)  Other (specify) 
 Permanent shack (corrugated iron, mixed brick)   
 
12. Is your household connected to an electricity supply (even if it is currently disconnected)? 
 Yes   No 
13. What is the MAIN source of energy for COOKING in your household? [just ask question without going through entire list and 
then tick one] 
 Electricity from mains 
or generator 
 LPG Gas  Biogas  Charcoal 
 Solar Power  Firewood  Kerosene  Paraffin 
 




Marine Resource Use  
15. How old were you when you first became involved in? 















16.  Which marine resources have you and do you currently harvest? 
 
Marine Resources When 
(if possible 
indicate the  
year[s]) 
Where Have you ever 
had a permit or 
quota for this 
species? 
Y or N 
If you have had a 
permit, which 











this permit?   
Y   or   N 
If you have 
had a quota, 
how much was 
your quota (ie. 
Kilograms or 
tons)? 
When was this 
quota allocated? (ie. 
What year?) 
Do you have a 
recreational 
permit for this 
species? 
Y or N 
Kreef          
Hottentot          
White Mussel          
Rooivis/red roman/red 
stumpnose 
         
Snoek          
Harders          
Steenbras          





17.  Over the past year, what did you do with the resources that you harvested (for yourself or for others)?  Tick one for each resource. 
Marine Resources Sell 
everything 
Mainly sell (eat 
some) 
Eat everything Mainly eat (sell some) Share with 
neighbours 
Other (specify) If you sell, who do 




informal or formal 




What is the average 
price that you sell 
for? (ie. 
R10/bundle; R60 
per kilo etc) 
Kreef         
Hottentot         
White Mussel         
Rooivis/red roman/red 
steenbras 
        
Snoek         
Harders         
Steenbras         









18. Have you ever applied for a permit or a quota and were not successful?   
 Yes   No 



















22. In your opinion, what are the greatest threats to the marine resources in the area? 
 Increase in human activity in area  Commercial fisheries: trawlers 
 Market demand  Commercial fisheries : Ski boats 
 Fishers from outside   Climate change 
 Type of gear  Poachers 
 Over-fishing   Other: 
 
 Mother     Father 
23.  Were/are your parents involved in fisheries-related activities?        Yes?     N     No ? 
If yes, in which 
activities? Tick 
all that apply 
Collecting inshore resources (bait, mussels, etc.)   
  Worker for commercial fishing company (name(s))   
  Fish from shore   
  Boat-owner (sole or share)   
 Skipper   
Shore-based job – (PAID):  driver, repair nets/engines, processing etc.   
Shore-based job – (UNPAID):  repair nets, cleaning fish etc.   
Crew/boat assistant   
Diver   
Own fishing company (specify)   
Shares in a fisher's company (name)   
Marketer/agent (paid or unpaid)   
other   
24. What fishing activities have YOU been involved in over the past year? Tick all that apply 
Collecting inshore resources (bait, mussels, etc.)  
Worker for commercial fishing company (provide name)  
Fish from shore  
Boat-owner (sole or share)  
Skipper  
Shore-based job – (PAID):  driver, repair nets/engines, processing etc.  
 Shore-based job – (UNPAID):  repair nets, cleaning fish etc.  
Crew/boat assistant  
Diver  
Has own company (specify)  
Shares in a fisher's company (name)  
Marketer/agent (paid or unpaid)  
Other   
 
25. If you are a boat owner do you have crew that work for you? 
 Yes   No 
26. If so, how many? 
 
27. What type of boat do you own? 
 




29. Is there a local fishing committee or organization within your community? 
 Yes  No 
30. If YES, are you a member of this committee/organization?         
 Yes  No 
31. What is the name of the organisation of which you are a member? 
 
 
32. Do you feel that this committee or organization represents your interests? 
 Yes  No 
 
Food security 
33. In the last month, has there been a day when your household had to skip a meal because of a shortage of food? 
 Yes  No 
34. If YES, how often: 




35. Are you or anyone in your household forced to fish because of a lack of food?    
 Yes  No 
 
36. How often do members of your household eat fish (including lobster and mussels)? 
 Once a day  Two days per week 
 Twice a day  Three days per week 






38. How much of your income comes from fisheries-related activities: 
 All of it 
37.  What present activities contribute towards income and food in your household? Tick ALL that are applicable and go 
through each. Then rank. 
 All activities that 
contribute to HH 
monthly income 









(1 being most 
important) 
Rank the THREE 
most important 
activities in terms of 




(1) Harvesting marine resources    
      (2)  Harvesting crops (fruit, vegetables etc.)    
      (3)   Livestock (poultry, cattle etc.)    
      (4)  Harvesting wood    
      (5)  Harvesting wild plants    
      (6)  Employment in fishing industry (specify)    
       (7)  Other employment (specify)    
     (8)  Self-employed (i.e. shop owner, taxi driver):    
      (9)  Pension    
      (10)  Government grants (specify)    
      (11) other    
2 
 
 Most of it 
 Some of it 
 None of it 
 
39. How many people contribute to the total household income? 
 
 








Understanding the SSFP 
44?. In your opinion, what will be the difference between fishing with a commercial right and fishing under the new community 







45. For this new 2014 season, did you apply for a commercial fishing right in any sector?        
Yes No 






47. For this new 2014 season, are you fishing using the interim community fishing right?                                                                    
Yes No  
















51. In your opinion, are there small-scale fishers who do not want the new Small-Scale Fisher Policy implemented? If so, please 
explain why. 
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Thank You 
 
